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Abstract 
 
How strong are strategic complementarities in price setting across firms? In this paper, we provide a 
direct empirical estimate of firm price responses to changes in prices of their competitors. We 
develop a general framework and an empirical identification strategy to estimate the elasticities of a 
firm’s price response to both its own cost shocks and to the price changes of its competitors. Our 
approach takes advantage of a new micro-level dataset for the Belgian manufacturing sector, which 
contains detailed information on firm domestic prices, marginal costs, and competitor prices. The 
rare features of these data enable us to construct instrumental variables to address the simultaneity 
of price setting by competing firms. We find strong evidence of strategic complementarities, with a 
typical firm adjusting its price with an elasticity of 35% in response to the price changes of its 
competitors and with an elasticity of 65% in response to its own cost shocks. Furthermore, we find 
substantial heterogeneity in these elasticities across firms, with small firms showing no strategic 
complementarities and a complete cost pass-through, while large firms responding to their cost 
shocks and competitor price changes with roughly equal elasticities of around 50%. We show, using 
a tightly calibrated quantitative model, that these findings have important implications for shaping 
the response of domestic prices to international shocks. 
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1 Introduction
How strong are strategic complementarities in price setting across rms? Do rms mostly respond to
their own costs, or do they put a signicant weight on the prices set by their competitors? The answers
to these questions are central for understanding the transmission of shocks through the price mech-
anism, and in particular the transmission of international shocks such as exchange rate movements
across borders.1 A long-standing classical question in international macroeconomics, dating back at
least to Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987), is how international shocks aect domestic prices. Al-
though these questions are at the heart of international economics, and much progress has been made
in the literature, the answers have nonetheless remained unclear due to the complexity of empirically
separating the movements in the marginal costs and markups of rms.
In this paper, we construct a new micro-level dataset for Belgium containing all the necessary in-
formation on rms’ domestic prices, their marginal costs, and competitors’ prices, to directly estimate
the strength of strategic complementarities across a broad range of manufacturing industries. We de-
velop a general accounting framework, which allows us to empirically decompose the price change of
the rm into a response to the movement in its own marginal cost (the idiosyncratic cost pass-through)
and a response to the price changes of its competitors (the strategic complementarity elasticity). An
important feature of our accounting framework is that it does not require us to commit to a specic
model of demand, market structure and markups to obtain our estimates.
Within our accounting framework, we develop an identication strategy to deal with two major
empirical challenges. The rst is the endogeneity of the competitor prices, which are determined si-
multaneously with the price of the rm in the equilibrium of the price-setting game. The second is
the measurement error in the marginal cost of the rm. We exploit the rare features of our dataset to
construct instrumental variables. In particular, our data contain information not only on the domestic-
market prices set by the rm and all of its competitors (both domestic producers and importers), but
also measures of the domestic rm marginal costs, which are usually absent from most datasets. We
proxy for the exogenous cost shocks to the rms with changes in the unit values of the imported in-
termediate inputs at a very high level of disaggregation (over 10,000 products by source country). This
allows us to instrument for both the prices of the competitors (with their respective cost shocks) and
for the usual noisy proxy for the overall marginal cost of the rm measured as the ratio of total vari-
able costs to output. Our results are robust to replacing the rm input price instruments with the rm
import-weighted exchange rates, addressing potential endogeneity concerns.
Our results provide strong evidence of strategic complementarities. We estimate that, on aver-
age, a domestic rm changes its price in response to competitors’ price changes with an elasticity of
about 0.35.2 In other words, when the rm’s competitors raise their prices by 10%, the rm increases
its own price by 3.5% in the absence of any movement in its marginal cost, and thus entirely translating
into an increase in its markup. At the same time, the elasticity of the rm’s price to its own marginal
1In macroeconomics, the presence of strategic complementarities in price setting creates additional persistence in response
to monetary shocks in models of staggered price adjustment (see e.g. Kimball 1995, and the literature that followed).
2In our baseline estimation, the set of a rm’s competitors consists of all rms within its 4-digit manufacturing industry,
and our estimate averages the elasticity both across rms within industry and across all Belgian manufacturing industries.
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cost, holding constant the prices of its competitors, is on average about 0.7, corresponding to a 70%
pass-through. These estimates stand in sharp contrast with the implications of the workhorse model in
international economics, which features CES demand and monopolistic competition and implies con-
stant markups, a complete (100%) cost pass-through and no strategic complementarities in price setting.
However, a number of less conventional models that relax either of those assumptions (i.e., CES demand
and/or monopolistic competition, as we discuss in detail below) are consistent with our ndings, pre-
dicting both a positive response to competitors’ prices and incomplete pass-through. In our estimation,
we cannot reject that the two elasticities sum to one, providing important information to discriminate
among models of variable markups.
We further show that the average estimates for all manufacturing rms conceal a great deal of
heterogeneity in the elasticities across rms. We nd that small rms exhibit no strategic complemen-
tarities in price setting, and pass through fully the shocks to their marginal costs into their prices. The
behavior of these small rms is approximated well by a monopolistic competition model under CES
demand, which implies constant markup pricing. In contrast, large rms exhibit strong strategic com-
plementarities and incomplete pass-through of own marginal cost shocks. Specically, we estimate
their idiosyncratic cost pass-through elasticity to be about 55%, and the elasticity of their prices with
respect to the prices of their competitors to be about 45%. These large rms, though small in number,
account for the majority of sales, and therefore shape the average elasticities in the data.3
In order to explore the implications of our empirical estimates of strategic complementarities for
the transmission of international shocks into domestic prices, we turn to a calibrated equilibrium model
of variable markups. The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to explore aggregate exchange
rate pass-through in counterfactual industries that are not typical in Belgian manufacturing, but are
more characteristic in other countries. In addition, the calibrated model allows us to study the de-
terminants of industry-level pass-through and its decomposition into the marginal cost and markup
channels by types of rms.4 For our analysis, we adopt the oligopolistic competition model under CES
demand, following Atkeson and Burstein (2008). We show that this model, disciplined with the rich-
ness of the Belgian micro-data on the joint distribution of rm market shares and import intensities,
is successful in capturing the empirical cost pass-through and strategic complementarity patterns in the
cross-section of rms. We show that reproducing the observed cross-sectional heterogeneity is central
for understanding the patterns of the aggregate exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices.
In the calibrated model, we match the average exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT) into domestic
manufacturing prices across typical Belgium industries, equal to 32%, and study the determinants of the
variation in ERPT across industries. At the industry level, the two main predictors of pass-through are
the average import intensity of domestic rms (operating through the marginal cost channel) and the
market share of foreign rms (operating through the markup channel of the domestic rms). We further
3Our baseline denition of a large rm is a rm in the top quintile (largest 20%) of the sales distribution within its 4-digit
industry. The cuto large rm (at the 80th percentile of the sales distribution) has, on average, a 2% market share within its
industry. The large rms, according to this denition, account for about 65% of total manufacturing sales.
4In principle, this could be done directly in the data without relying on a structural model, however prices in the data are
shaped by a variety of simultaneous shocks, making such an analysis infeasible with a sucient level of precision, while the
calibrated model oers a suitable laboratory for this exercise.
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show that the within-industry heterogeneity also plays an important role. In particular, “granular”
industries with very pronounced large rms exhibit greater pass-through due to their stronger strategic
complementarities. In addition, the industries with a strong positive relationship between rm size and
import intensity exhibit lower pass-through. Indeed, this pattern of cross sectional heterogeneity limits
the average markup adjustment to an exchange rate shock, as the large variable-markup rms benet
little from a devaluation when they rely heavily on imported intermediate inputs.
In our counterfactual exercises, we analyze how much of the aggregate ERPT into domestic prices is
driven by the markup adjustment. For the set of industries that are typical in the Belgium economy, the
markup adjustment plays a very limited role, with most of the price adjustment through the marginal
cost channel due to the high import intensity of Belgian rms. Neither small nor large rms show
substantial markup adjustment. While we expect this for small rms, the nding for the large rms is
intriguing in light of their substantial strategic complementarities. Indeed, these rms are sensitive to
price adjustment by their foreign competitors, but they are also exposed to the exchange rate deval-
uation through the increased prices of their imported inputs. As a result, they do not gain much of a
competitive edge in the domestic market, and thus have little scope to adjust their markups. We next
turn to counterfactual industries, which are less typical in Belgian manufacturing, but are more charac-
teristic in other countries. We nd that the markup adjustment contributes the most to aggregate ERPT
in industries where domestic rms source their inputs locally, which allows them to gain a signicant
competitive edge over the foreign rms following an exchange rate devaluation. The role for markups
is enhanced in industries that additionally face intense foreign competition. In this case, large domestic
rms raise their markups in response to the increased prices of their foreign competitors.
Our paper is the rst to provide direct evidence on the extent of strategic complementarities in price
setting across a broad range of industries. It builds on the literature that has estimated pass-through
and markup variability in specic industries such as cars (Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter 1996), coee
(Nakamura and Zerom 2010), and beer (Goldberg and Hellerstein 2013). By looking across a broad
range of industries, we explore the importance of strategic complementarities at the macro level for
the pass-through of exchange rates into aggregate producer prices. The industry studies typically rely
on structural estimation by adopting a specic model of demand and market structure, which is tailored
to the industry in question.5 In contrast, for our estimation we adopt a general accounting framework,
with an identication that relies on instrumental variables estimation, providing direct evidence on the
importance of strategic complementarities within a broad class of price setting models.
The few studies that have focused on the pass-through of exchange rate shocks into domestic con-
sumer and producer prices have mostly relied on aggregate industry level data (see, e.g. Goldberg
and Campa 2010). The more disaggregated empirical studies that use product-level prices (Auer and
5A survey by De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) contrasts these studies with an alternative approach for recovering markups
based on production function estimation, which was originally proposed by Hall (1986) and recently developed by De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2012; orth, DLGKP). Our identication strategy,
which relies on the direct measurement (of a portion) of the marginal cost and does not involve a production function es-
timation, constitutes a third alternative for recovering information about the markups of the rms. If we observed the full
marginal cost, we could calculate markups directly by subtracting it from prices. Since we have an accurate measure of only
a portion of the marginal cost, we identify only certain properties of the rm’s markup, such as its elasticities. Nonetheless,
with enough observations, one can use our method to reconstruct the entire markup function for the rms.
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Schoenle 2013, Cao, Dong, and Tomlin 2012, Pennings 2012) have typically not been able to match
the product-level price data with rm characteristics, prices of local competitors, nor measures of rm
marginal costs, which play a central role in our identication. Without data on rm marginal costs,
one cannot distinguish between the marginal cost channel and strategic complementarities. The lack
of data on domestic product prices at the rm-level matched with international data shifted the focus
of analysis from the response of domestic prices broadly to the response of prices of exporters and
importers. For example, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) provide indirect evidence using import price
data that is consistent with the presence of strategic complementarities in pricing, yet as the authors
acknowledge, this evidence could also be consistent with the correlated cost shocks across the rms.6
Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) demonstrate the importance of imported inputs for explaining
incomplete ERPT into Belgian export prices. The unavailability of comprehensive measures of com-
petitor prices and market shares prevented these studies from providing direct estimates of strategic
complementarities. The new Belgian data helps overcome these limitations and enables us to perform
counterfactual analysis.
Although the main international shock we consider is an exchange rate shock, our analysis applies
more broadly to other international shocks such as trade reforms and commodity price shocks. Studies
that analyze the eects of tari liberalizations on domestic prices mostly focus on developing countries,
where big changes in taris have occurred in the recent past. For example, DLGKP analyze the Indian
trade liberalization and Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015; henceforth EMX) study a counterfactual trade
liberalization in Taiwan, both nding evidence of procompetitive eects of a reduction in output taris.
These studies take advantage of detailed rm-product level data, but neither has matched import data,
which constitutes the key input in our analysis, enabling us to directly measure the component of the
rms’ marginal costs that is most directly aected by the international shocks.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set out the accounting framework to
guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical results. Section 4
sets up and calibrates an industry equilibrium model and performs counterfactuals. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In order to estimate the strength of strategic complementarities in price setting and understand the
channels through which international shocks feed into domestic prices, we proceed in two steps. First,
we derive our estimating equation within a general accounting framework, building on Gopinath, It-
skhoki, and Rigobon (2010) and Burstein and Gopinath (2012). We show that our estimating equation
nests a broad class of models, including oligopolistic competition models under very general demand
6Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) and Burstein and Gopinath (2012) survey a broader pricing-to-market (PTM) literature,
which documents that rms charge dierent markups and prices in dierent destinations, and actively use markup variation
to smooth the eects of exchange rate shocks across markets. Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) were rst to demonstrate that
large rms exhibit lower pass-through, which is consistent with greater strategic complementarities, relative to small rms.
7The second part of our analysis, in which we calibrate a model of variable markups to the Belgian micro-level data, is
most directly related to the exercise in EMX. Our analysis diers from EMX in that we bring in the import intensities and
foreign share distributions, in addition to the markup moments, which we show are critical in determining the importance
of strategic complementarities in shaping the aggregate exchange rate pass-through.
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and cost structures. Using this framework, we estimate the strength of strategic complementarities in
Section 3, and later we use these estimates in our quantitative analysis of the international transmission
of shocks in Section 4. For this exercise we commit to a particular model of variable markups, described
in Section 2.2, which serves as an example for our more general accounting framework. We close with
a discussion of our identication strategy in Section 2.3.
2.1 General accounting framework
We start with an accounting identity for the log price of rm i in period t, which equals the sum of the
rm’s log marginal cost mcit and log markup µit:
pit ≡ mcit + µit, (1)
where our convention is to use small letters for logs and capital letters for the levels of the corre-
sponding variables. This identity can also be viewed as the denition of a rm’s realized log markup,
whether or not it is chosen optimally by the rm and independently of the details of the equilibrium
environment. Since datasets with precisely measured rm marginal costs are usually unavailable, equa-
tion (1) cannot be directly implemented empirically to recover rm markups. Instead, in what follows
we impose the minimum structure on the equilibrium environment that is necessary to convert the
price identity (1) into a decomposition of price changes, which can be estimated in the data to recover
important properties of the rm’s markup.8
We focus on a given industry s with N competing rms, denoted with i ∈ {1, .., N}, where N
may be nite or innite. We omit the industry identier when it causes no confusion. Our analysis is
at the level of the rm-product, and for now we abstract from the issue of multi-product rms, which
we reconsider in Section 3. We denote with pt ≡ (p1t, .., pNt) the vector of prices of all rms in the
industry, and with p−it ≡ (p1t, .., pi−1,t, pi+1,t, .., pNt) the vector of prices of all rm-i’s competitors,
and we make use of the notational convention pt ≡ (pit,p−it). We consider an invertible demand
system qit = qi(pt; ξt) for i ∈ {1, .., N}, which constitutes a one-to-one mapping between any vector
of prices pt and a corresponding vector of quantities demanded qt ≡ (q1t, .., qNt), given the vector
of demand shifters ξt = (ξ1t, . . . , ξNt). The demand shifters summarize all variables that move the
quantity demand given a constant price vector of the rms.
We now reproduce a familiar expression for the prot maximizing log markup of the rm:
µit = log
σit
σit − 1 , (2)
which expresses the markup as a function of the curvature of demand, namely the demand elasticity σit.
In fact, the characterization (2) of the optimal markup generalizes beyond the case of monopolistic
competition, and also applies in models with oligopolistic competition, whether in prices (Bertrand)
8An alternative approach in the Industrial Organization literature imposes a lot of structure on the demand and compe-
tition environment in a given sector in order to back out structurally the implied optimal markup of the rm, and then uses
identity (1) to calculate the marginal cost of the rm as a residual (see references in the Introduction).
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or in quantities (Cournot). More precisely, for any demand and competition structure, there exists
a perceived demand elasticity function of rm i, σit ≡ σi(pt; ξt), such that the rm’s static optimal
markup satises (2). Outside the monopolistic competition case, σit depends both on the curvature of
demand and the conjectured equilibrium behavior of the competitors.9 We summarize this logic in:
Proposition 1 For any given invertible demand system and any given competition structure, there exists
a markup function µit =Mi(pit,p−it; ξt), such that the rm’s static prot-maximizing price p˜it is the
solution to the following xed point equation:
p˜it = mcit +Mi
(
p˜it,p−it; ξt
)
, (3)
given the price vector of the competitors p−it.
We provide a formal proof of this intuitive result in Appendix C, and here oer a brief commentary
and a discussion of the assumptions. The markup functionMi(pt; ξt) and the xed point in (3) formal-
ize the intuition behind the optimal markup expression (2). Note that Proposition 1 does not require
that competitor prices are equilibrium outcomes, as equation (3) holds for any possible vector p−it.
Therefore, equation (3) characterizes both the on- and o-equilibrium behavior of the rm given its
competitors’ prices, and thus with a slight abuse of terminology we refer to it as the rm’s best response
schedule (or reaction function).10 The full industry equilibrium is achieved when equations correspond-
ing to (3) hold for every rm i ∈ {1, .., N} in the industry, that is all rms are on their best response
schedules.
Proposition 1 relies on two assumptions. One, the demand system is invertible. This is a mild tech-
nical requirement, which allows us to fully characterize the market outcome in terms of a vector of
prices, with a unique corresponding vector of quantities recovered via the demand system. The in-
vertibility assumption rules out the case of perfect substitutes, where multiple allocations of quantities
across rms are consistent with the same common price, as long as the overall quantity
∑N
i=1 qit is
unchanged. At the same time, our analysis allows for arbitrarily large but nite elasticity of substitu-
tion between varieties, which approximates well the case of perfect substitutes (see Kucheryavyy 2012).
Note that this assumption does not rule out most popular demand systems, including CES (as in e.g.
Atkeson and Burstein 2008), linear (as in e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano 2008), Kimball (as in e.g. Gopinath
and Itskhoki 2010), translog (as in e.g. Feenstra and Weinstein 2010), discrete-choice logit (as in e.g.
Goldberg 1995), and many others. Our analysis also applies under the general non-homothetic demand
9The perceived elasticity is dened as σit ≡ − dqitdpit = −
[
∂qi(pt;ξt)
∂pit
+
∑
j 6=i
∂qi(pt;ξt)
∂pjt
dpjt
dpit
]
, where dpjt/dpit is the
conjectured response of the competitors. Under monopolistic competition, dpjt/dpit ≡ 0, and the perceived elasticity is
determined by the curvature of demand alone. The same is true under oligopolistic price (Bertrand) competition. Under
oligopolistic quantity (Cournot) competition, the assumption is that dqjt/dqit ≡ 0 for all j 6= i, which results in a system of
equations determining {dpjt/dpit}j 6=i as a function of (pt; ξt), as we describe in Appendix C.
10In fact, when the competition is oligopolistic in prices, (3) is formally the reaction function. When competition is monop-
olistic, there is no strategic motive in price-setting, but the competitor prices nonetheless can aect the curvature of a rm’s
demand and hence its optimal price, as captured by equation (3). This characterization also applies in models of oligopolistic
competition in quantities, where the best response is formally dened in the quantity space, in which case (3) is the mapping
of the best response schedule from quantity space into price space.
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system considered by Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-Clare (2015; henceforth ACDR),
which in turn nests, as they show, a large number of commonly used models of demand.
The second assumption is that rms are static prot maximizers under full information. This as-
sumption excludes dynamic price-setting considerations such as menu costs (as e.g. in Gopinath and
Itskhoki 2010) or inventory management (as e.g. in Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan 2010). It is
possible to generalize our framework to allow for dynamic price-setting, however in that case the esti-
mating equation is sensitive to the specic dynamic structure.11 Instead, in Section 3, we address this
assumption empirically, which conrms that the likely induced bias in our estimates from this static
assumption is small.
Importantly, Proposition 1 imposes no restriction on the nature of market competition, allowing for
both monopolistic competition (as N becomes unboundedly large or as rms do not internalize their
eect on aggregate prices) and oligopolistic competition (for any nite N ).12 Note that the markup
functionMi(·) is endogenous to the demand and competition structure, that is, its specic functional
form changes from one structural model to the other. What Proposition 1 emphasizes is that for any
such model, there exists a corresponding markup function, which describes the price-setting behavior
of rms. In particular, the implication of Proposition 1 is that competitor prices p−it form a sucient
statistic for rm-i’s pricing decision, i.e. conditional on p−it the rm’s behavior does not depend on the
competitors’ marginal costsmc−it ≡ {mcjt}j 6=i. We test this property in Section 3.3.
Our next step in deriving the estimating equation is to totally dierentiate the best response con-
dition (3) around some admissible point (pt; ξt) = (p˜it,p−it; ξt), i.e. any point that itself satises
equation (3). We obtain the following decomposition for the rm’s log price dierential:
dpit = dmcit +
∂Mi(pt; ξt)
∂pit
dpit +
∑
j 6=i
∂Mi(pt; ξt)
∂pjt
dpjt +
N∑
j=1
∂Mi(pt; ξt)
∂ξjt
dξjt, (4)
Note that the markup functionMi(·) is not an equilibrium object as it can be evaluated for an arbitrary
price vector pt = (pit,p−it), and therefore (4) characterizes all possible perturbations to the rm’s
price, both on and o equilibrium, in response to shocks to its marginal cost dmcit, the prices of its
competitors {dpjt}j 6=i, and the demand shifters {dξjt}Nj=1. In other words, equation (4) does not require
that the competitor price changes are chosen optimally or correspond to some equilibrium behavior,
as it is a dierential of the best response schedule (3), and thus it holds for arbitrary perturbations to
competitor prices.13 Importantly, note that the perturbation to the optimal price of the rm does not
depend on the shocks to competitor marginal costs, as competitor prices provide a sucient statistic
11The adopted structural interpretation of our estimates is specic to the exible-price model, where µit is the static
prot-maximizing oligopolistic markup. Nonetheless, our statistical estimates are still informative even when price setting is
dynamic. In this case, the realized markup µit is not necessarily statically optimal for the rm, yet its estimated elasticity is
still a well-dened object, which can be analyzed using a calibrated model of dynamic price setting (e.g., a Calvo staggered
price setting model or a menu cost model, as in Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010). We choose not to pursue this alternative
approach due to the nature of our data, as we discuss in Section 3.1.
12Beyond oligopolistic competition, Proposition 1 also applies to some sequential-move price-setting games, such as Stack-
elberg competition, yet for simplicity we limit our focus here to the static simultaneous-move games.
13Combining equations (4) for all rms i = 1..N , we can solve for the equilibrium perturbation (reduced form) of all
prices dpt as a function of the exogenous cost and demand shocks d(mct, ξt), which we discuss in Section 2.3.
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for the optimal price of the rm (according to Proposition 1).
By combining the terms in competitor price changes and solving for the xed point in (4) for dpit,
we rewrite the resulting equation as:
dpit =
1
1 + Γit
dmcit +
Γ−it
1 + Γit
dp−it + εit, (5)
where we introduce the following new notation:
Γit ≡ −∂Mi(pt; ξt)
∂pit
and Γ−it ≡
∑
j 6=i
∂Mi(pt; ξt)
∂pjt
(6)
for the own and (cumulative) competitor markup elasticities respectively, and where the (scalar) index of
competitor price changes is dened as:
dp−it ≡
∑
j 6=i ωijtdpjt with ωijt ≡
∂Mi(pt; ξt)/∂pjt∑
k 6=i ∂Mi(pt; ξt)/∂pkt
. (7)
This implies that, independently of the demand and competition structure, there exists a theoretically
well-dened index of competitor price changes, even under the circumstances when the model of the
demand does not admit a well-dened ideal price index (e.g., under non-homothetic demand). The index
of competitor price changes dp−it aggregates the individual price changes across all rm’s competitors,
dpjt for j 6= i, using endogenous (rm-state-specic) weights ωijt, which are dened to sum to one.
These weights depend on the relative markup elasticity: the larger is the rm’s i markup elasticity
with respect to price change of rm j, the greater is the weight of rm j in the competitor price index.
Finally, the residual in (5) is rm i’s eective demand shock given by εit ≡ 11+Γit
∑N
j=1
∂Mi(pt;ξt)
∂ξjt
dξjt.
The own markup elasticity Γit is dened in (6) with a negative sign, as many models imply that
a rm’s markup function is non-increasing in rm’s own price, ∂Mi(pt;ξt)∂pit ≤ 0. Intuitively, a higher
price of the rm may shift the rm towards a more elastic portion of demand (e.g., as under Kimball
demand) and/or reduce the market share of the rm (in oligopolistic competition models), both of which
result in a lower optimal markup (see Appendix D). In contrast, the markup elasticity with respect
to competitor prices is typically non-negative, and when positive it reects the presence of strategic
complementarities in price setting. Nevertheless, we do not impose any sign restrictions on Γit and Γ−it
in our empirical analysis in Section 3.
Equation (5) is the theoretical counterpart to our estimating equation, which is the focus of our
empirical analysis in Section 3. It decomposes the price change of the rm dpit into responses to its
own cost shock dmcit, the competitor price changes dp−it, and the demand shifters captured by the
residual εit. The two coecients of interest are:
ψit ≡ 1
1 + Γit
and γit ≡ Γ−it
1 + Γit
. (8)
The coecient ψit measures the own (or idiosyncratic) cost pass-through of the rm, i.e. the elasticity
of the rm’s price with respect to its marginal cost, holding the prices of its competitors constant. The
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coecient γit measures the strength of strategic complementarities in price setting, as it is the elasticity
of the rm’s price with respect to the prices of its competitors.14 The coecients ψit and γit are shaped
by the markup elasticities Γit and Γ−it: a higher own markup elasticity reduces the own cost pass-
through, as markups are more accommodative of shocks, while a higher competitor markup elasticity
increases the strategic complementarities elasticity.
In order to empirically estimate the coecients in the theoretical price decomposition (5), we need
to measure the competitor price index (7) in the data. We now provide conditions, as well as a way to
test them empirically, under which the weights in (7) can be easily measured in the data. Let zt denote
the log industry expenditure function, dened in a standard way.15 We then have (see Appendix C):
Proposition 2 (i) If the log expenditure function zt is a sucient statistic for competitor prices, i.e. if
the demand can be written as qit = qi(pit, zt; ξt), then the weights in the competitor price index (7) are
proportional to the competitor revenue market shares Sjt, for j 6= i, and given by ωijt ≡ Sjt/(1 − Sit).
Therefore, the index of competitor price changes simplies to:
dp−it ≡
∑
j 6=i
Sjt
1− Sitdpjt. (9)
(ii) If, furthermore, the perceived demand elasticity is a function of the price of the rm relative to the
industry expenditure function, i.e. σit = σi(pit − zt; ξt), the two markup elasticities in (6) are equal:
Γ−it ≡ Γit. (10)
The key property of the expenditure function for the purposes of this proposition is the Shephard’s
lemma: the elasticity of the expenditure function with respect to rm-j’s price equals rm-j’s mar-
ket share, ∂zt/∂pjt = Sjt. This claries why the relevant weights in the competitor price index (9)
are proportional to the market shares. Indeed, under the assumption of part (i) of the proposition, the
markup function can be written asMi(pit, zt; ξt), so that ∂Mit/∂pjt = ∂Mit/∂zt ·Sjt by Shephard’s
lemma. The result then follows from the denitions in (7). The condition in part (ii) of the proposi-
tion implies the condition in part (i), and further implies that the markup function isMi(pit − zt; ξt),
so that ∂Mit/∂pit = −∂Mit/∂zt, and hence (10) follows from the denitions in (6).
The main assumption of Proposition 2 is that the demand function depends only on (pit, zt) rather
than on (pit,p−it), or in words the log expenditure function zt summarizes all necessary information
contained in competitor prices p−it. While this assumption is not innocuous, and in particular imposes
symmetry in preferences,16 it is satised for a broad class of demand models considered in ACDR and
14This abuses the terminology somewhat since γit can be non-zero even under monopolistic competition when rm’s
behavior is non-strategic, yet the complementarities in pricing still exist via the curvature of demand. In this case, the term
demand complementarity may be more appropriate. Furthermore, γit could, in principle, be negative, in which case the prices
of the rms are strategic substitutes. Also note that in models of oligopolistic competition, constant competitor prices do not
in general constitute an equilibrium response to an idiosyncratic cost shock for a given rm. This is because price adjustment
by the rm induces its competitors to change their prices as well because of strategic complementarities. Nonetheless, ψit is
a well-dened counterfactual elasticity, characterizing a rm’s best response o equilibrium.
15Formally, zt=log min{Qit}
{∑N
i=1 PitQit
∣∣U({Qit};Qt) = 1}, whereU(·) is the preference aggregator, which denes
the industry consumption aggregator Qt.
16Namely, the signicance of any rm for all other rms is summarized by the rm’s market share. Proposition 2 also rules
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Parenti, Thisse, and Ushchev (2014), including all separable preference aggregatorsQt =
∑N
i=1 ui(Qit),
as in Krugman (1979). In addition, Proposition 2 oers a way to empirically test the implication of its
assumptions. Indeed, condition (10) on markup elasticities implies that the two coecients in the price
decomposition (5) sum to one. In other words, using the notation in (8), it can be summarized as the
following parameter restriction:
ψit + γit = 1. (11)
We do not impose condition (10) and the resulting restriction (11) in our estimation, but instead test it
empirically. This also tests the validity of the weaker property (9) in Proposition 2, which we adopt for
our measurement of the competitor price changes, and then relax it non-parametrically in Section 3.3.
To summarize, we have established that the price change decomposition in (5) holds across a broad
class of models. We are interested in estimating the magnitudes of elasticities ψit and γit in this de-
composition, as they have a sucient statistic property for the response of rm prices to shocks, inde-
pendently of the industry demand and competition structure. We now briey describe one structural
model, which oers a concrete illustration for the more general discussion up to this point.
2.2 A model of variable markups
The most commonly used model in the international economics literature follows Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) and combines constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand with monopolistic competition.
This model implies constant markups, complete pass-through of the cost shocks and no strategic com-
plementarities in price setting. In other words, in the terminology introduced above, all rms have
Γit ≡ Γ−it ≡ 0, and therefore the cost pass-through elasticity is ψit ≡ 1 and the strategic complemen-
tarities elasticity is γit ≡ 0. Yet, these implications are in gross violation of the stylized facts about the
price setting in actual markets, a point recurrently emphasized in the pricing-to-market literature fol-
lowing Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987).17 In the following Section 3 we provide direct empirical
evidence on the magnitudes of ψit and γit, both of which we nd to lie strictly between zero and one.
In order to capture these empirical patterns in a model, one needs to depart from either the CES as-
sumption or the monopolistic competition assumption. As in Krugman (1987) and Atkeson and Burstein
(2008), we depart from the monopolistic competition market structure and instead assume oligopolistic
competition, while maintaining the CES demand structure.18 Specically, customers are assumed to
have a CES demand aggregator over a continuum of industries, while each industry’s output is a CES
aggregator over a nite number of products, each produced by a separate rm. The elasticity of substi-
tution across industries is η ≥ 1, while the elasticity of substitution across products within an industry
out cases in which a sucient statistic exists but is dierent from the expenditure function, as is the case for the Kimball
demand discussed in Appendix D. We show, nonetheless, that Proposition 2 still provides a good approximation in that case.
17Fitzgerald and Haller (2014) oer a direct empirical test of pricing-to-market and Burstein and Gopinath (2012) provide
a survey of the recent empirical literature on the topic.
18The common alternatives in the literature maintain the monopolistic competition assumption and consider non-CES
demand: for example, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) use linear demand (quadratic preferences), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010)
use Kimball (1995) demand, and Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) use translog demand. In Appendix D, we oer a generalization
to the case with both oligopolistic competition and non-CES demand following Kimball (1995).
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is ρ ≥ η. Under these assumptions, a rm with a price Pit faces demand (with capitals denoting levels):
Qit = ξitDstP
ρ−η
st P
−ρ
it , (12)
where ξit is the product-specic preference shock and Dst is the industry-level demand shifter. The
industry price index Pst corresponds in this case to the expenditure function, and is given by:
Pst =
[∑N
i=1
ξitP
1−ρ
it
]1/(1−ρ)
, (13)
whereN is the number of rms in the industry. The rms are large enough to aect the price index, but
not large enough to aect the economy-wide aggregates that shift Dst, such as aggregate real income.
Further, we can write the rm’s market share as:
Sit ≡ PitQit∑N
j=1 PjtQjt
= ξit
(
Pit
Pst
)1−ρ
, (14)
where the second equality follows from the functional form of rm demand in (12) and the denition
of the price index in (13). A rm has a large market share when it charges a low relative price Pit/Pst
(since ρ > 1) and/or when its product has a strong appeal ξit in the eyes of the consumers.
As in much of the quantitative literature following Atkeson and Burstein (2008), as for example
in EMX, we assume oligopolistic competition in quantities (i.e., Cournot-Nash equilibrium). While
the qualitative implications are the same as in the model with price competition (i.e., Bertrand-Nash),
quantitatively Cournot competition allows for greater variation in markups across rms, which better
matches the data, as we discuss further in Section 4. Under this market structure, the rms set prices
according to the following markup rule:19
Pit =
σit
σit − 1MCit, where σit =
[
1
η
Sit +
1
ρ
(1− Sit)
]−1
, (15)
where σit is the perceived elasticity of demand. Under our parameter restriction ρ > η > 1, the markup
is an increasing function of the rm’s market share.
The elasticity of the markup with respect to own and competitor prices is:
Γit = −
∂ log σitσit−1
∂ logPit
=
(ρ− η)(ρ− 1)σitSit(1− Sit)
ηρ(σit − 1) , (16)
and Γ−it = Γit, which can be established using the denition in (6). Furthermore, using the general
denition in (7), we verify in Appendix C that the index of competitor price changes in this model satis-
es (9), and hence both results of Proposition 2 apply. One additional insight from this model is that Γit
is a function of the rm’s market share Sit alone, given the structural demand parameters ρ and η, that
is Γit ≡ Γ(Sit). Furthermore, this function is increasing in market share over the relevant range of mar-
19The only dierence in setting prices under Bertrand competition is that σit=ηSit+ρ(1−Sit), as opposed to the expres-
sion given in (15), and all the qualitative results remain unchanged. Derivations for both cases are provided in Appendix C.
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ket shares in the data, and equals zero at zero market share, Γ(0) = 0.20 Specically, small rms have
Γit= Γ−it= 0, and hence exhibit complete pass-through of own cost shocks (ψit=1) and no strategic
complementarities (γit = 0), behaving as monopolistic competitors under CES. However, rms with
positive market shares have Γit = Γ−it > 0, and hence incomplete pass-through and positive strategic
complementarities in price setting, ψit, γit ∈ (0, 1). Intuitively, small rms charge low markups and
have only a limited capacity to adjust them in response to shocks, while large rms set high markups
and actively adjust them to maintain their market shares. This oers sharp testable hypotheses.
2.3 Identication
In order to estimate the two elasticities of interest, ψit and γit in the theoretical price decomposition (5),
we rewrite this equation in changes over time:
∆pit = ψit∆mcit + γit∆p−it + εit, (17)
where ∆pit ≡ pi,t+1 − pit. Therefore, the estimating equation (17) is a rst-order Taylor expansion
for the rm’s price in period t+ 1 around its equilibrium price in period t. Estimation of equation (17)
is associated with a number of identication challenges. First, it requires obtaining direct measures of
rm marginal costs and an appropriate index of competitor prices. Second, instrumental variables are
needed to deal with the endogeneity of prices and measurement error in marginal costs. Lastly, the
heterogeneity in coecients ψit and γit needs to be accommodated. We now address these challenges.
Measurement of marginal cost Good rm-level measures of marginal costs are notoriously hard
to come by. We adopt the following rather general model of the marginal cost:
MCit =
W 1−φitit V
φit
it
Ait
Y αiit , (18)
whereWit and Vit are the rm-i-specic cost indexes of domestic and imported inputs, φit is the import
intensity of the rm (i.e., the expenditure share of imported inputs),Ait is the idiosyncratic productivity,
and yit is the output index. Finally, αi ≥ 0 is the degree of decreasing returns to scale, which is allowed
to be rm-specic, but assumed to be constant over time.21 Note that this model does not restrict the
production structure to be Cobb-Douglas, as the expenditure elasticity φit is not required to be constant.
Denoting the logs of variables with corresponding small letters, we rewrite (18) in log changes:
∆mcit = φit∆vit + (1− φit)∆wit + ∆φit(vit − wit) + αi∆yit − ait. (19)
20It is immediate to verify that Γ′(S) > 0 at least for S ∈ [0, 0.5], while in our data sectoral market shares in excess of 50%
are nearly non-existent, with the typical industry leader commanding a market share of 10–12% of the market (see Section 4).
When η = 1, the case adopted for our calibration, Γ(S) = (ρ − 1)S, and hence Γ′(S) > 0, for S ∈ [0, 1). In Appendix D
we show that the role of the market share as a determinant of the markup elasticity is general across all oligopolistic models,
yet other rm-level variables may also aect it outside the CES case.
21This model does not rule out the possibility of xed costs, which can give rise to increasing returns to scale.
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Under this cost structure, the log changes in marginal costs are equal to the log changes in the average
variable costs, independently of the value of the returns to scale parameter αi:
∆mcit = ∆avcit, (20)
where avcit ≡ log
(
TV Cit/Yit
)
and TV Cit denotes the total variable costs of production. Therefore,
we use the change in the log average variable costs from the rm accounting data to measure the change
in the log marginal cost. Since this is potentially a very noisy measure of the marginal cost, we deal
with the induced measurement-error bias by means of an instrumental variable. As the instrument, we
use one component of the marginal cost, which we can measure with great precision in our dataset,
namely the change in the log costs of the imported intermediate inputs:
∆mc∗it = φit∆vit. (21)
We provide further details of the measurement and additional specication tests in Section 3.1.
Measurement of competitor prices An important advantage of our dataset is that we are able to
measure price changes for all of the rm’s competitors, including all domestic and all foreign competi-
tors, along with their respective market shares in a given industry. However, constructing the relevant
index of competitor price changes requires taking a stand on the weights ωijt in (7). We follow Propo-
sition 2, and use the discretized version of (9):
∆p−it =
∑
j 6=i
Sjt
1− Sit∆pjt. (22)
We test empirically the assumptions underlying Proposition 2, namely the parameter restriction (11).
In addition, in Section 3.3, we relax (22) non-parametrically by subdividing the competitors into more
homogenous subgroups, in particular based on their origin and size, and estimating separate strategic
complementarity elasticities for each subgroup.
Endogeneity and instrumental variables The next identication challenge is the endogeneity of
the competitor prices on the right-hand side of the estimating equation (17). Even though the the-
oretical equation (5) underpinning the estimating equation is the best response schedule rather than
an equilibrium relationship, the variation in competitor prices observed in the data is an equilibrium
outcome, in which all prices are set simultaneously as a result of some oligopolistic competition game.
Therefore, estimating (5) requires nding valid instruments for the competitor price changes, which
are orthogonal with the residual source of changes in markups captured by εit in (17). Our baseline
identication strategy uses the precisely-measured imported component of the rm’s marginal cost,
∆mc∗jt dened in (21), as the instrument. Specically, we aggregate ∆mc∗jt for j 6= i into an index to
instrument for ∆p−it. As an alternative strategy, instead of using the measures of marginal costs as
instruments, we use their projections on the relevant weighted exchange rates. We discuss additional
instruments used, as well as robustness under alternative subsets of the instruments, in Section 3.
13
Heterogeneity of coecients Finally, the estimating equation (17) features heterogeneity in the
coecients of interest ψit and γit. In our baseline, we pool the observations to estimate common coef-
cients ψ and γ for all rms and time periods, which we interpret as average elasticities across rms.
The two potential concerns here are that the IV estimation can complicate the interpretation of the
estimates as the averages, and the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity may result in biased esti-
mates. We address these issues non-parametrically, by splitting our observations into subgroups of
rm-products that we expect to have more homogenous elasticities. In particular, guided by the struc-
tural model of Section 2.2, the elasticitiesψit and γit are functions of the market share of the rm within
industry (and nothing else). While not entirely general, this observation is not exclusive to the CES-
oligopoly model, and is also maintained in a variety of non-CES models, as we discuss in Appendix D.
Accordingly, we split our rms into small and large bins, and estimate elasticities separately for each
subgroup. We discuss some additional slices of the sample in Section 3.3.
Alternative estimating equation We close this section with a brief discussion of our choice of
estimating equation (17). We use equilibrium variation in marginal costs and prices to estimate an o-
equilibrium object, namely a counterpart to the rm’s theoretical reaction function (5). Instead, one
could estimate the reduced form of the model:
∆pit = αit∆mcit + βit∆mc−it + ε˜it, (23)
which is an equilibrium relation between the rm’s price change and all exogenous shocks of the
model.22 Appendix C provides an explicit solution for the reduced-form coecients αit and βit, as
well as for the theoretically-grounded notion of the competitor marginal cost index ∆mc−it.
There are a number of reasons why we choose to estimate the reaction function (17) as opposed to
the reduced form (23). The rst reason is due to data limitations. Equation (23) requires measures of
the full marginal cost for all rms in order to construct ∆mc−it, whereas we only have comprehensive
measures of marginal costs available for the domestic competitors (and only proxies for a portion of
the marginal cost for foreign competitors). While this would constitute an omitted variable bias in (23),
it is not a problem for estimating (17), which only requires an instrument for the index of competitor
price changes ∆p−it, available in the data.23
Second, the coecients of the reaction function ψit and γit have a clear structural interpretation,
directly shaped by the rm’s markup elasticity Γit (recall (8)), which is a central object in the interna-
tional pricing-to-market literature, as well as in the monetary macroeconomics literature (as discussed
in Gopinath and Itskhoki 2011). In contrast, the reduced-form coecients compound various industry
equilibrium forces, and are thus much less tractable for structural interpretation. In addition, the es-
timated reaction function elasticities have an appealing sucient statistic property for describing the
rm’s response to various shocks, such as an exchange rate shock, a theme we return to in Section 4.
22Equation (23) is an empirical counterpart to the theoretical xed-point solution for equilibrium price changes of all rms
in the industry, which requires that conditions (5) hold simultaneously for all rms.
23Furthermore, it is challenging to construct the appropriate marginal cost index ∆mc−it, as its weights depend on the
rm-specic pass-through elasticities even when the conditions of Proposition 2 are satised (see Appendix C).
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data Description
To empirically implement the general accounting framework of Section 2, we need to be able to measure
each variable in equation (17). We do this by combining three dierent datasets for Belgium manufac-
turing rms for the period 1995 to 2007 at the annual frequency. The rst dataset is rm-product level
production data (PRODCOM), collected by Statistics Belgium. A rare feature of these data is that it
reports highly disaggregated information on both values and quantities of sales, which enables us to
construct domestic unit values at the rm-product level. It is the same type of data that is more com-
monly available for rm-product exports. Firms in the Belgian manufacturing sector report production
values and quantities for all their products, dened at the PC 8-digit (over 1,500 products). The survey
includes all Belgian rms with a minimum of 10 employees, which covers over 90% of production value
in each NACE 4-digit industry (which corresponds to the rst 4 digits of the PC 8-digit code).24 Firms
are required to report total values and quantities but are not required to report the breakdown between
domestic sales and exports. Therefore, to get a measure of domestic values and quantities we merge
on the export data from customs and subtract total export values and quantities from total production
values and quantities sold.
The second dataset, on imports and exports, is collected by Customs. These data are reported at
the rm level by destination and source country for each product classied at the 8-digit combined
nomenclature (CN) in values and quantities, with around 10,000 distinct products. The rst 6-digits of
the CN codes correspond to the World Harmonized System (HS). These data are easily merged with
the PRODCOM data using a unique rm identier; however, the product matching between the two
datasets is more complicated, as we describe in Appendix B.
The third dataset, on rm characteristics, draws from annual income statements of all incorporated
rms in Belgium. These data are used to construct measures of total variable costs. They are available
on an annual frequency at the rm level. Each rm reports its main economic activity within a 5-
digit NACE industry, but there is no individual rm-product level data available from this dataset. We
combine these three datasets to construct the key variables for our analysis.25
Domestic Prices The main variable of interest is the price of the domestically sold goods, which we
proxy using the log change in the domestic unit value, denoted ∆pit, where i corresponds to a rm-
product at the PC-8-digit level. The domestic unit values are calculated as the ratio of production value
24We only kept rms that reported their main activity to be within the manufacturing sector, dened as NACE 2-digit codes
15 to 36.
25Jozef Konings had access to these condential data during his aliation with the National Bank of Belgium.
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sold domestically to production quantity sold domestically:26
∆pit = ∆ log
Domestic Valueit
Domestic Quantityit
(24)
We clean the data by dropping the observations with abnormally large price jumps, namely with year-
to-year price ratios above 3 or below 1/3.
Marginal Cost Changes in a rm’s marginal cost can arise from changes in the price of imported
and domestic inputs, as well as from changes in productivity. We have detailed information on a rm’s
imported inputs, however the datasets only include total expenditure on domestic inputs without any
information on individual domestic input prices or quantities. Given this limitation, we need to infer
the rm’s overall marginal cost. We follow (20), and construct the change in the log marginal cost of
rm i as follows:
∆mcit = ∆ log
Total Variable Costit
Yit
, (25)
where total variable cost is the sum of the total material cost and the total wage bill, and Yit is the
production quantity of the rm.27 Note thatmcit is calculated at the rm level and it acts as a proxy for
the marginal cost of all products produced by the rm. We address the possible induced measurement
error for multi-product rms with a robustness check in Section 3.3.
Our marginal cost variable ∆mcit is likely to be a noisy measure more generally, as we rely on
rm accounting data to measure economic marginal costs. Therefore, we construct the foreign-input
component of a rm’s marginal cost, a counterpart to (21), which we measure as follows:
∆mc∗it = φit
∑
m
ωcimt∆vimt, (26)
where φit is the rm’s overall import intensity (the share of expenditure on imported intermediates
in total variable costs), m indexes the rm’s imported inputs at the country of origin and CN-8-digit
product level, and ∆vimt are the changes in the log unit values of the rm’s imported intermediate
inputs (in euros). The weights ωcimt are the average of t and t − 1 rm import shares of input m, and
when a rm does not import a specic input m at either t − 1 or t, this input is dropped from the
calculation of ∆mc∗it. We also drop all abnormally large jumps in import unit values. Additionally, we
take into account that not all imports are intermediate inputs. In our baseline case, we dene an import
to be a nal good for a rm if it also reports positive production of that good. To illustrate, suppose
a rm imports cocoa and chocolate, and it also produces chocolate. In that case we would classify the
imported cocoa as an intermediate input and the imported chocolate as a nal good, and hence only
26In order to get at the domestic portion of total production, we need to net out rm exports. One complication in con-
structing domestic sales is the issue of carry-along-trade (see Bernard, Blanchard, Van Beveren, and Vandenbussche 2012),
arising when rms export products that they do not themselves produce. To address this issue we drop all observations for
which exports of a rm in period t are greater than 95% of production sold (dropping 11% of the observations and 15% of
revenues, and a much lower share of domestic value sold since most of these revenues come from exports).
27More precisely, we calculate the change in the log production quantity as the dierence between ∆ log Revenues and
∆ log Price index of the rm, and subtract the resulting ∆ log Yit from ∆ log Total Variable Costit to obtain ∆mcit in (25).
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the imported cocoa would enter in the calculation of the marginal cost variable.
Competition Variables When selling goods in the Belgian market, Belgian rms in the PRODCOM
sample face competition from other Belgian rms that produce and sell their goods in Belgium (also in
the PRODCOM sample), as well as from the rms not in the PRODCOM sample that import goods to
sell in the Belgian market. We refer to the former set of rms as the domestic rms and the latter as the
foreign rms. To capture these two dierent sources of competition, we construct the price indexes for
each group of competitors within an industry. Specically, we follow (22), and calculate the index of
competitor price changes as:
∆p−it = ∆pD−it + ∆p
F
−it, (27)
where
∆pD−it =
∑
j∈Di
Sjt
1− Sit∆pjt and ∆p
F
−it =
∑
j∈Fi
Sjt
1− Sit∆pjt, (28)
Di and Fi denote respectively the sets of domestic and foreign rm-product competitors of rm i,
and Sjt is the rm-product market shares in Belgium in industry s dened as the ratio of the rm-
product domestic sales to the total market size.28 Only the imports categorized as nal goods enter
in the construction of the foreign competitor price index, i.e. any imports that are not included in the
construction of the marginal costs.
We dene an industry at the NACE 4-digit level and include all industries for which there are
a sucient number of domestic rms in the sample (around 160 industries). We chose this level of
aggregation in order to avoid huge market shares arising solely due to narrowly dened industries, and
we show the robustness of our results to more disaggregated industry denitions in Section 3.3.
Instruments The instrument to address the measurement error in rms’ marginal cost ∆mcit is the
foreign component of the marginal cost ∆mc∗it, dened above in (26). Here, we describe the construc-
tion of the three additional instruments we use to address the endogeneity of the competitors’ prices
in ∆p−it, each proxying for the marginal costs of the dierent types of competitors. For the domestic
competitors, we use a weighted average (in parallel with ∆pD−it in (28)) of each domestic competitor’s
foreign component of marginal cost:
∆mc∗−it =
∑
j∈Di
Sjt
1− Sit −
∑
`∈Fi S`t
∆mc∗jt,
with the weights normalized to sum to one over the subset of domestic competitorsDi (see footnote 28).
In the robustness Section 3.3, we replace the marginal cost instruments ∆mc∗it and ∆mc∗−it with the
corresponding rm-level exchange rates, weighted by rm import intensities from specic source coun-
28In the denominator in (28), Sit is the cumulative market share of rm i in industry s (identied by the given product of
the rm), which constitutes a slight abuse of notation to avoid numerous additional subscripts. Note that
∑
j∈Fi Sjt is the
cumulative market share of all foreign rms in the industry of rm i, and
∑
j∈Di Sjt is the cumulative market share of all
domestic rms net of rm i in the same industry. Therefore,
∑
j∈Di Sjt +
∑
j∈Fi Sjt = 1−Sit, and the sum of the weights
in (28) equals one. In practice, we measure Sjt as the average of t and t− 1 market shares of rm-product j.
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tries, which we denote with ∆eit.29
For foreign competitors, direct measures of marginal costs are unavailable in our data, and thus we
construct alternative instruments. For the non-euro foreign rms, we proxy for their marginal costs
using the industry import-weighted exchange rate:
∆est =
∑
k
ωeskt∆ekt,
where k indexes source countries and ωeskt is the share of competitors from country k in industry s.
Finally, for the euro foreign rms, we construct a proxy for their marginal costs using their export
prices to European destination other than Belgium. We construct this instrument in two steps. In the
rst step, we take Belgium’s largest euro trading partners (Germany, France, and Netherlands, which
account for 80% of Belgium’s imports from the euro area) and calculate weighted averages of the change
in their log export prices to all euro area countries, except Belgium. Then for each product (at the CN
8-digit level) we have the log change in these export price indexes for each of the three countries. In
the second step, we aggregate these up to the 4-digit industry level, using the value of imports of each
product into Belgium as import weights. The idea is that movements in these price indexes should
positively correlate with movements in Belgium’s main euro trading partners’ marginal costs without
being aected by the demand conditions in Belgium. We denote this instrument with ∆pEUst . Summary
statistics for all variables are provided in the Appendix Table A1.
3.2 Empirical Results
We now turn to estimating the strength of strategic complementarities in price setting across Belgian
manufacturing industries using the general accounting framework developed in Section 2. We do this
by regressing the annual change in log rm-product prices on the changes in the rm’s log marginal cost
and its competitors’ price index, as in equation (17). This results in two estimated average elasticities,
the own cost pass-through elasticity ψ and the strategic complementarities elasticity γ (see (8)). Under
the conditions of Proposition 2, these two elasticities sum to one, resulting in parameter restriction (11),
which we test empirically without imposing it in estimation. Section 2.2 further suggests that these two
elasticities are non-constant and vary systematically with the market share of the rm. We allow for
this heterogeneity in elasticities in the second part of the section by estimating the main specication
separately for small and large rms.
Baseline estimates Table 1 reports the results from the baseline estimation. All of the equations are
weighted using one-period lagged domestic sales and the standard errors are clustered at the 4-digit
industry level. In the rst two columns of panel A, we estimate equation (17) using OLS, with year
xed eects in column 1 and with both year and industry xed eects in column 2. The coecients on
29Formally, in parallel with (26), ∆eit = φit
∑
m ω
c
imt∆emt, that is we replaced the input price changes ∆vimt with the
corresponding bilateral exchange rate changes ∆emt, wherem denotes the source country for each imported input of rm i.
Note that if rm i does not import outside the euro area, ∆eit ≡ 0. The bilateral exchange rates are average annual rates
from the IMF, reported for each country relative to the US dollar and converted to be relative to the euro.
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Table 1: Strategic complementarities
Panel A: Baseline estimates
OLS IV
Dep. var.: ∆pit (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆mcit 0.348∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.117) (0.150)
∆p−it 0.400∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗
(0.079) (0.095) (0.143) (0.151)
# obs. 64,815 64,815 64,815 64,815
Industry F.E. no yes no yes
H0: ψ + γ = 1 0.75 0.67 1.13 1.07
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.52]
Overidentication J-test 0.04 0.06
χ2 and [p-value] [0.98] [0.97]
Weak Instrument F -test 129.6 115.2
Panel B: First stage regressions
Column (3) Column (4)
Dep. var.: ∆mcit ∆p−it ∆mcit ∆p−it
∆mc∗it 0.614∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.039) (0.014) (0.033)
∆mc∗−it 0.392∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.148) (0.124) (0.106)
∆est −0.222 0.270∗∗ −0.169 0.343∗∗
(0.230) (0.120) (0.258) (0.144)
∆pEUst 0.194∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.053) (0.049) (0.053)
Industry F.E. no no yes yes
First stage F -test 46.92 22.39 41.24 33.53
[p-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: All regressions are weighted by lagged domestic rm sales and include year xed eects, with robust standard errors
clustered at the industry level. In panel B, the rst (last) two columns present the rst stage regressions corresponding to col-
umn 3 (4) in panel A. See the text for the denition of the instruments. The IV regressions pass the weak instrument test with
F -stats well above critical values and pass all over-identication tests. The null of Proposition 2 (parameter restriction (11)
on the sum of the coecients) cannot be rejected in both IV specications, while it is rejected in OLS specications.
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both the rm’s marginal cost and on the competitors’ price index are positive, of similar magnitudes and
signicant, yet the two coecients only sum to 0.7, violating the parameter restriction of Proposition 2.
These estimates, however, are likely to suer from endogeneity bias due to the simultaneity of price
setting by the rm and its competitors ∆p−it, as well as from downward bias due to measurement
error in our marginal cost variable ∆mcit. Indeed, while our proxy for marginal cost, as described
in equation (25), has the benet of encompassing all of the components of marginal costs, it has the
disadvantage of being measured with a lot of noise.
To address these concerns, we reestimate equation (17) using instrumental variables. For the rm’s
marginal cost, we instrument with the foreign component of its marginal cost ∆mc∗it, as dened in
equation (26).30 For the competitor price index, we instrument with the three proxy measures of com-
petitors’ marginal costs, as dened in section 3.1. We present the results using all of these instruments
combined in columns 3 and 4 of panel A, with and without industry xed eects respectively, and report
the corresponding rst-stage regressions in panel B of Table 1. In order to be valid, the instruments
need to be orthogonal to the residual εit in (17), which reects shocks to demand and perceived quality
of the product. Our instruments are plausibly uncorrelated with this residual, and we conrm the va-
lidity of the instruments with the Hansen overidentication J-tests (reported in Table 1.A), which the
data passes with very large p-values. We oer a further discussion of the validity of the instruments
in Section 3.3. Our instruments also pass the weak identication tests, with the F -stat over 100, well
above the critical value of around 12.
The coecients in the rst-stage results are economically meaningful. In the rm marginal cost
∆mcit equations, the largest coecient of around 0.6 is on the rm’s own foreign component of the
marginal cost ∆mc∗it, while the competitor marginal cost index ∆mc∗−it has a coecient of about
0.4, both highly statistically signicant. This reects the positive correlation between the cost shocks
across rms, yet this correlation is moderate in size (equal to 0.27), allowing for sucient independent
variation in the two variables, necessary for identication.31 The industry weighted exchange rate
∆est has an insignicant eect after controlling for the foreign components of the marginal costs,
which likely already contains the sucient information. For the competitor price ∆p−it equations, all
of the instruments are positive and signicant, as expected, with the largest coecient of around 0.5 on
the domestic competitors’ foreign-component of marginal costs ∆mc∗−it. These patterns are the same
for the regressions with and without the industry eects.
We now turn to a discussion of our baseline IV estimates of the pass-through and strategic comple-
mentarity elasticities in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.A. We see that the coecient on the rm’s marginal
cost almost doubles in size compared to the OLS results in columns 1–2. Moreover, the two coecients
now sum to one, supporting the parameter restriction (11).32 This implies that the data are consistent
30One way to see that ∆mc∗it is more precisely measured than ∆mcit is with the projection of ∆mcit on ∆mc∗it, which
results in a large and highly signicant coecient of 0.97, while the inverse projection yields a coecient of close to zero
(0.04). This is suggestive that ∆mcit is a good proxy for the marginal cost of the rm, yet a very noisy one. The formal rst
stage, reported in Table 1.B, regresses ∆mcit simultaneously on ∆mc∗it and all other instruments.
31Formally, identication requires that ∆mcit is not too closely correlated with ∆p−it, which in theory requires suciently
uncorrelated shocks to marginal costs across rms. In the data, the correlation between ∆mcit and ∆p−it is only 0.09.
32The bottom part of Table 1.A reports the sums of the coecients along with the p-values for the test of equality to one.
In the IV regressions, the sum of the coecients is slightly above one and well within the condence bounds for the test of
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with the class of models identied in Proposition 2, and our approach to measuring the competitor
price index according to (9) is not at odds with the data. Nonetheless, we oer additional robustness
tests, which relax the structure imposed on the competitor price index, in Section 3.3.
The results in Table 1 show that rms exhibit incomplete pass-through of their cost shocks, holding
constant the competitor prices, with an average elasticityψ of around 0.65–0.75. At the same time, rms
exhibit substantial strategic complementarities, adjusting their prices with an average elasticity γ in the
range of 0.30–0.45 in response to the price changes of their competitors, in the absence of any own-cost
shocks. In other words, in response to a 10% increase in competitor prices, the rm raises its own price
by 3–4.5% in the absence of any own cost shocks, thus entirely translating into an increase in the rm’s
markup. These estimates are very stable, falling within this range across various specications and
subsamples, as we report in Section 3.3. The estimates of γ and ψ oer a direct quantication of the
strength of strategic complementarities in price setting across Belgian manufacturing rms. Using (8),
we can convert these estimates to recover the average markup elasticity Γ of about 0.6 (recall that we
cannot reject Γ−it = Γit). This estimate is largely in line with the values suggested by Gopinath and
Itskhoki (2011) based on the analysis of various indirect pieces of evidence.33
Heterogeneity The results in Table 1.A provide us with average pass-through and strategic com-
plementarity elasticities across Belgian manufacturing. In Table 2, we explore whether there is hetero-
geneity in rms’ responses, by allowing the coecients on the marginal cost and competitor price index
to vary with the rm’s size. We begin with dening a large rm as one with 100 or more employees on
average over the sample period. Columns 1 and 2 report the results from IV estimation of equation (17)
for the sub-samples of small and large rms separately. In comparison to the average baseline results,
we nd that small rms have a larger coecient on their own marginal cost, equal to 0.93, insigni-
cantly dierent from 1, and a small and insignicant coecient of 0.08 on the competitor price index. In
contrast, large rms have a smaller coecient on marginal cost and a larger coecient on the competi-
tor price index, both signicant and both around 0.5. An alternative way to identify dierential eects
between small and large rms is to pool all rms in one equation and interact both right-hand-side
variables with a Largei dummy, as in column 3. We nd the same pattern of results, albeit with more
noisy estimates, as in the rst two columns: the two elasticities for the small rms are estimated at 0.95
and 0.14, while these elasticities for the large rms are 0.63 (= 0.95−0.32) and 0.42 (= 0.14+0.28).
Despite these dierences between the large and small rms, the sum of the elasticities for each group
still equals one, consistent with Proposition 2 and the structural model of Section 2.2. Consequently,
equality to unity. When we estimate the constrained version of equation (17) in unreported results, imposing the restriction
that the coecients sum to one, the estimate of the coecient on the rm’s marginal cost is unaected, equal to 0.7, consistent
with the reported unconstrained results.
33Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) further discuss the relationship of these estimates with the calibrations of the strategic
complementarities in popular monetary macro models. The markup elasticity Γ plays an important role in the New Keynesian
literature, as it directly aects the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In order to obtain substantial amplication of
monetary non-neutrality, the literature has adopted rather extreme calibrations with Γ > 5, an order of magnitude above our
estimates. Our results, however, do not imply that strategic complementarities in price setting are unimportant for monetary
business cycles, yet this mechanism alone cannot account for the full extent of monetary non-neutralities and it needs to be
reinforced by other mechanisms (such as roundabout production as in Basu 1995).
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Table 2: Strategic complementarities: Heterogeneity
Largei dened as: Employment ≥ 100
Market Share Industry
Top 20% Above 2% ×Year F.E.
Sample: Small Large All All All All
Dep. var.: ∆pit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆mcit 0.929∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.201) (0.226) (0.192) (0.129)
∆mcit × Largei 0.599∗∗ −0.315 −0.270 −0.284 −0.297∗
(0.237) (0.351) (0.356) (0.305) (0.178)
∆p−it 0.078 0.142 0.063 0.016
(0.189) (0.225) (0.180) (0.126)
∆p−it × Largei 0.469∗∗ 0.279 0.355 0.509∗∗
(0.202) (0.319) (0.325) (0.308)
# obs. 49,462 15,353 64,815 64,815 64,815 64,815
Overid. J-test 4.99 0.03 6.48 2.68 2.02 —
χ2 and [p-value] [0.08] [0.98] [0.17] [0.61] [0.73]
Weak IV F -test 89.1 27.7 59.1 54.3 53.8 211.5
Notes: Regressions in columns 1 to 5 include industry xed eects and year xed eects, with robust standard errors clustered
at the industry level; observations are weighted with lagged domestic rm sales; and the instrument set is as in Table 1.
Column 6 includes industry-times-year xed eects and drops the competitor price variables, with standard errors clustered
at the rm level. The specication in column 6 is exactly identied with two endogenous variables and two instruments
∆mc∗it and ∆mc∗it× Largei. The denition of Largei is employment-based in columns 1–3 and 6 and market-share-based in
columns 4–5, as described in the text. All specications include variable Largei in levels. Table A4 reports the rst stage.
constraining the coecients to sum to one in columns 1 to 3 yields the same results (unreported).
In the next two columns we re-estimate the specication in column 3 using alternative denitions of
large rms based on a rm’s market shares within its respective 4-digit industry. In column 4, we dene
large rms to be those in the top 20% of their 4-digit industry and in column 5 those with average market
shares exceeding 2% within their industry. We nd virtually unchanged results. In the last column, we
show that the specication in column 3 is also robust to including industry times year xed eects to
replace the competitor price index ∆p−it. This specication addresses the potential concern about the
eects of correlated industry-level marginal costs shocks, as well as the measurement of an appropriate
competitor price index.34
Our results suggest substantial heterogeneity in rms’ pass-through elasticities and strategic com-
plementarities in price setting. Namely, the small rms exhibit nearly complete pass-through of cost
shocks (ψ ≈ 1) and almost no strategic complementarities in price setting (γ ≈ 0), consistent with the
behavior of monopolistic competitors under CES demand. Indeed, this corresponds to the predicted
behavior of rms with nearly zero market shares in the oligopolistic competition model of Section 2.2.
34Since the variation in ∆p−it is mostly at the industry-year level, including industry times year xed eects eectively
controls for competitor prices and makes it impossible to identify the strategic complementarity elasticity. The own pass-
through elasticity, however, is identied from the within-industry-year rm-specic variation in ∆mcit.
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At the same time, the large rms behave very dierently, exhibiting both incomplete pass-through of
cost shocks (around 60%) and strong strategic complementarities in price setting (up to 47%).35 Since
these largest rms account for the majority of market sales, their behavior drives the average patterns
across all of manufacturing described in Table 1.A. In Section 4 we explore the implications of these
estimates for the counterfactual eects of international shocks on domestic prices and markups using
a calibrated model.
3.3 Robustness
In this section, we address a number of potential concerns regarding the baseline results of Section 3.2
by showing the robustness of our ndings to dierent samples, alternative instrument sets, and various
measures of the competitor price index.
Alternative samples First, our theoretical framework of Section 2 relies on the assumption of static
exible price setting. If, instead, prices were set dynamically, as for example in sticky price models,
the markups of rms could mechanically move with shocks, resulting in incomplete pass-through of
marginal cost shocks. More generally, with sticky prices we would expect the price changes to be on
average smaller for any given set of shocks, as some rms fail to adjust prices. Consequently, we would
expect downward biased estimates for both of our elasticities, with less biased estimates over longer
time horizons, as more rms have a chance to fully adjust their prices. In column 1 of Table 3, we
reestimate our baseline specication from column 4 of Table 1.A with all variables constructed using
two-year dierences instead of the annual dierences used in the baseline regressions. We see that
the coecients are very similar in both cases, albeit somewhat less precisely estimated with two-year
dierences as the sample size shrinks. In particular, the sum of the two elasticities is still close to one.
This suggests that the sticky price bias does not play a major role in our baseline estimation using
annual price changes.
Second, there is the issue of how to dene an intermediate input. There is no clear way of deter-
mining whether a rm is importing a nal good or an intermediate input. In column 2, we use a more
narrow denition of what constitutes an intermediate input in the construction of the foreign compo-
nent of the marginal cost variable, ∆mc∗it. We dene an imported input to exclude the rm’s imports
within any 8-digit industry in which it has sales in any year (as in the baseline) and additionally exclude
imports in any CN-8-digit industry in which it exports. We see from column 2 that the coecients are
the same as in the baseline denition. Our results are also robust to other ways of dening intermediate
35In Appendix Table A3, we provide evidence that these heterogeneity results are not driven by spurious correlations in
the data. In particular, we show that results for large rms are not driven by exporters, where we limit the sample to large
rms with less than 10% of revenues coming from exports; nor by intra-rm trade, where we limit the sample to large rms
that had sales or purchases from their international aliates that accounted for less than half a percent of their total sales at
any time during the sample. Along similar lines, we show that our results for small rms are not driven by nonimporters.
For the subset of small importing rms, for which there is non-trivial variation in our baseline instrumental variable ∆mc∗it,
we consider both importers from within and from outside the euro area, and in both cases nd nearly identical results as for
the full subsample of small rms. In all of these cases, we nd the results are the same as in Table 2. In addition, Appendix
Table A4 reports the rst-stage regressions corresponding to columns 1–3 of Table 2, showing consistent patterns for both
small and large rms.
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Table 3: Robustness: alternative samples
Two-period Alternative Main Alternative industry level
dierences input denition product 5-digit 6-digit
Dep. var.: ∆pit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆mcit 0.642∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.193) (0.173) (0.139) (0.154)
∆p−it 0.434∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.374∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.157) (0.200) (0.150) (0.155)
# obs. 50,600 64,694 27,027 63,511 59,732
Notes: All regressions are counterpart to column 4 of Table 1: in particular, all regressions include the same set of instru-
ments (passing weak instrument and overidentication tests), as well as industry and year xed eects, with observations
weighted by lagged domestic rm sales and robust standard errors clustered at the industry level; in addition, the null that
the coecients sum to one is not rejected in any of the specications. Column 1 is in 2-period (year) dierences. Column 2
uses a stricter denition of intermediate inputs: it excludes any import in a 8-digit industry that the rm produces and any
CN 8-digit code that the rm exports. Column 3 only includes observations in the rm’s largest 8-digit product category in
terms of domestic sales. Columns 4 and 5 dene all competition variables relative to 5- and 6-digit industries (around 270 and
320 industries) respectively.
inputs, in particular, to further restricting inputs to exclude any product within the rm’s own 4-digit
industry.
A third potential concern is that the marginal cost variable is at the rm level whereas our unit of
observation is at the rm-product level, resulting in a measurement error. It is generally dicult to as-
sign costs across products within rms (see DLGKP for one approach). To check that this multiproduct
issue is not biasing our results (in particular, biasing downwards the coecient on the own marginal
cost ∆mcit), we reestimate our baseline equation with a subsample limited to only include each rm’s
main product, dened as the 8-digit product with the rm’s largest domestic sales. We see from column
3 that our results are quantitatively robust to limiting the sample to the rms’ main product, suggesting
at most a limited role for a potential measurement error bias.
The nal two columns of Table 3 experiment with alternative denitions of an industry. In our
baseline, we dene an industry at the 4-digit NACE level, which divides the 1,500 8-digit products in
our sample into about 160 industries. In columns 4 and 5 we redene the competition variables at the
more narrow 5- and 6-digit industries, respectively. We nd the results to be qualitatively robust under
these alternative denitions, with the extent of strategic complementarities somewhat increasing with
the more disaggregated industry denitions.
Alternative sets of instruments Although our instruments jointly pass the overidentication J-test,
one may still be concerned with the validity of each of the instruments, which may be challenged on
dierent grounds. We show in Table 4 that our ndings are not sensitive to dropping any one instru-
ment used in the baseline estimation (Table 1). Since the potential source of endogeneity for dierent
instruments is not the same, this suggests that either all of the instruments are jointly valid or all of
them are invalid and there is some improbable pattern of correlation between the instruments and the
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Table 4: Robustness: alternative sets of instruments
Exclude: pEUst ∆est ∆mc∗−it ∆mc∗it and ∆mc∗−it
Include: — — ∆wit — ∆eit,∆e−it +∆wit,∆w−it
Dep. var.: ∆pit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆mcit 0.757∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.595 0.407∗∗
(0.175) (0.195) (0.157) (0.136) (0.461) (0.196)
∆p−it 0.314 0.291 0.402∗∗ 0.330∗ 0.462 0.648∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.196) (0.161) (0.173) (0.459) (0.206)
# obs. 64,815 64,815 64,815 64,815 64,736 64,698
Notes: All regressions are counterpart to column 4 of Table 1, as described in the notes to Table 3. In all cases, the regressions
pass the weak instrument F -test and the overidentication J-test, and the null that the coecients sum to one cannot be
rejected. The baseline set of instruments as in Table 1 and includes ∆mc∗it, ∆mc∗−it, ∆est and ∆pEUst . Each column of the
table drops one (or two) of these instruments in turn. Column 1 drops international competitor prices ∆pEUst . Column 2
and 3 drop industry import-weighted exchange rate ∆est, while column 3 also adds rm-level log wage rate change ∆wit.
Column 4 drops ∆mc∗−it. Columns 5 and 6 drop both own and competitor marginal cost instruments ∆mc∗it and ∆mc∗−it
and add rm and competitor import-weighted exchange rate changes ∆eit and ∆e−it; column 6 in addition adds rm and
competitor log wage rate changes ∆wit and ∆w−it.
residuals (for further discussion, in a dierent context, see Duranton and Turner 2012).
We experiment with dierent subsets of the baseline instrument set, by rst dropping the proxy
for the marginal costs of euro zone foreign competitors, ∆pEUst . We see from column 1 of Table 4
that there is no material change in the point elasticities (relative to column 4 of Table 1.A), but the
standard errors on the competitor price index are a bit higher. In column 2, we instead drop the industry
import-weighted exchange rate, ∆est, leaving our instrument set free of any exchange rate variables.
This again leads to quantitatively the same estimates. In column 3, simultaneously with dropping the
exchange rate, we add the log change in the rm’s wage rate ∆wit (calculated as the ratio of the wage
bill to employment) to the instrument set, which restores the statistical signicance of the strategic
complementarities elasticity. Our results, therefore, are not dependent on the use of the exchange rate
or euro country export prices as instruments.
In columns 4–6, we experiment with dropping marginal cost measures from the instrument set to
address the potential concern that the imported components of the marginal cost variables may be en-
dogenous with the demand shocks of the rms, due to either rm quality upgrading or upward sloping
rm-level supply curves for inputs. Specically, column 4 drops the competitor imported marginal cost
index ∆mc∗−it, while columns 5 and 6 drop in addition the rm’s own imported marginal cost mea-
sure ∆mc∗it. We instead use as instruments the rm import-weighted log exchange rate change ∆eit
and, by analogy, the competitor index ∆e−it (column 5). We add to this set the rm’s wage rate change
∆wit and the index of competitor wage rate changes ∆w−it (column 6). In all three cases, we nd
similar elasticities to our baseline estimates.36 Overall, our baseline IV results are robust to alterna-
36When we omit ∆mc∗it from the instrument set, and instead rely on rm-level exchange rates, we estimate a somewhat
smaller own pass-through elasticity and a larger strategic complementarity elasticity. This may reect a dierent local average
treatment eect (LATE) associated with the rm-level exchange rate instrument ∆eit, for which ∆eit ≡ 0 for all rms that
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Table 5: Robustness: alternative measures of competitor prices
Domestic Largest Competitors outside With
vs Foreign competitor rm’s 4-d. industry ∆mc−it
Dep. var.: ∆pit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆mcit 0.764∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.852∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.201) (0.507) (0.158) (0.143) (0.163)
∆p−it 0.676 0.293 0.372
(1.417) (0.353) (0.389)
∆pD−it 0.258
(0.407)
∆pF−it 0.387
(0.411)
∆pL−it 0.441 −0.529
(0.293) (2.136)
∆p−st −11.29 −1.333
(8.13) (16.835)
∆mcD−it −0.073
(0.406)
# obs. 64,815 64,815 64,815 64,815 64,815 64,772
Notes: All regressions build on the baseline specication in column 4 of Table 1 (see notes to Table 3). Column 1 splits the
competitor price index ∆p−it into domestic and foreign components ∆pD−it and ∆pF−it, according to (27)–(28). Columns 2 and
3 include the log price change of the rm’s largest competitor in the industry, denoted with ∆pL−it. Columns 4 and 5 include
competitor price index outside the rm’s own 4-digit industry, denoted ∆p−st. Column 6 includes domestic competitor
marginal costs ∆mcD−it (the measure of foreign competitor marginal costs is unavailable in our data).
tive instrument subsets, when we dispense with either the exchange rate instruments or the imported
marginal cost instruments.
Competitor prices and placebo tests Our nal set of robustness tests addresses potential concern
about the measurement of the competitor price index ∆p−it. So far, we have constructed it using com-
petitor market shares as weights, following Proposition 2, and our results have supported the testable
implication of Proposition 2 in the form of parameter restriction (11). Nonetheless, we check for the
robustness of our measure. First, there might be concern with the imposition of the same elasticity
across dierent competitors. In column 1 of Table 5, we allow a rm to be dierentially sensitive to
its domestic and foreign competitors in the home market. Specically, we split the overall competitor
price index ∆p−it into its domestic and foreign components ∆pD−it and ∆pF−it, as dened in (27)–(28),
and estimate two separate coecients. We nd the two estimated elasticities to be insignicantly dif-
ferent from each other, as well as quantitatively close to the common elasticity estimated in the baseline
specication in column 4 of Table 1.A, which suggests that restricting the strategic complementarity
elasticity to be the same in response to domestic and foreign competitors is not at odds with the data.
do not import inputs outside the euro area, while the imported marginal cost ∆mc∗it is non-zero even for rms importing
only from within the euro area (see Section 3.1).
26
In columns 2 and 3 we instead allow for the possibility that the rms follow only the largest rm in
the industry, and are not sensitive to the prices of other competitors, as in an industry-leader model. We
test this by including in the regression the log price change of the largest competitor in the industry,
replacing ∆p−it in column 2 and along with ∆p−it in column 3. In both cases we nd insignicant
coecients on the price change of the largest rm. Furthermore, in column 3, where the two competitor
price change variables are included together, the coecient on the price change of the largest rm is
negative, while the coecient on the competitor price index remains positive. These results imply that
there is no extraordinary role for the largest rm in the industry, beyond its eect on the industry price
index proportional to its market share, as captured by our baseline competitor price index ∆p−it.
The remaining three columns of Table 5 oer two dierent types of placebo tests. In columns 4
and 5, we include a competitor price index constructed using the price changes of products outside the
rm’s own 4-digit industry, ∆p−st. Provided that our denition of an industry is correct, the prices of
products outside that industry should not matter. This is indeed what we nd, where the coecient
on this outside price index is negative with huge standard errors, and in column 5 the point estimate
on the within-industry competitor price index ∆pit remains unchanged relative to the baseline. Lastly,
column 6 includes the marginal cost index for the rm’s competitors ∆mc−it, which according to
Proposition 1 should have no eect on rm pricing once we control for competitor prices ∆p−it. This
theoretical prediction is again borne out by the data.
4 Strategic Complementarities and Exchange Rate Shocks
In this section, we consider the eect of an exchange rate shock on domestic prices. We use the frame-
work developed in Section 2 to delve into the mechanisms by which international shocks are trans-
mitted into domestic prices, in light of the signicant strategic complementarities we identied in the
rm-level empirical analysis of Section 3. To this end, we use a quantitative model, tightly calibrated
to capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity we observe in the Belgian manufacturing industries. We
show how the interaction between rm-level strategic complementarities and import intensities shape
the aggregate markup and price responses to exchange rate shocks.
4.1 From micro to macro
We provide a general framework to account for exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) into costs, markups
and prices, starting at the rm level and aggregating up to the industry level, by specializing the price
decomposition in equation (5) to the case of an exchange rate shock det (with det> 0 corresponding
to a domestic currency depreciation). Assuming that the idiosyncratic demand shifters {ξit} are not
systematically correlated with the exchange rate shock, i.e. E{dεit/det} = 0, which is realistic in the
context of individual products in dierentiated industries, we can write the projection of equation (5)
onto exchange rates as:
ψit =
1
1 + Γit
ϕit +
Γit
1 + Γit
Ψ−it, (29)
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where ψit ≡ E{dpit/det} is ERPT into rm-i’s price, Ψ−it ≡ E{dp−it/det} =
∑
j 6=i
Sjt
1−Sitψjt is ERPT
into its competitor prices, and ϕit ≡ E{dmcit/det} is its marginal cost sensitivity to exchange rate.
Note that we rely here on Proposition 2, which implies competitor price index (9) and Γ−it = Γit.
From (29) we can see that an exchange rate shock aects domestic prices through two distinct
mechanisms. The rst is a direct eect, which operates via marginal costs, due to changing prices of
imported (and possibly also domestic) inputs, summarized by ϕit in (29). We expect ϕit to be larger
for rms that source a bigger share of intermediate inputs internationally. The second, indirect, eect
operates through the interaction of strategic complementarities (Γit > 0) and the comovement of the
competitors’ nal goods prices with exchange rates (Ψ−it > 0). We expect individual domestic rms
to exhibit higher ERPT in environments with greater foreign competition, resulting in larger Ψ−it.
To see how a rm’s markup responds to exchange rate shocks, we rearrange (29) as follows:
E
{
dµit
det
}
= ψit − ϕit = Γit
1 + Γit
·
[
Ψ−it − ϕit
]
. (30)
This equation makes it clear that the rm adjusts its markup in response to an exchange rate shock
only when two conditions are simultaneously met: (1) Γit > 0, i.e. the rm has a variable markup and
exhibits strategic complementarities in pricing; and (2) ϕit 6= Ψ−it, i.e. the rm’s costs are aected
dierentially from the average price response of its competitors. Note that the rm’s markup can
either decrease or increase, depending on whether its costs increased by more or less than the prices
of its competitors. The conventional view is that a currency depreciation makes domestic rms more
competitive and raises markups in the domestic market (see discussion in Burstein and Gopinath 2012).
However, equation (30) makes clear that the markup adjustment by domestic rms in the domestic
market is more nuanced. It shows that the logic underlying the conventional view does apply when a
rm’s costs increase by less then the price of its average competitor. In that case, domestic rms gain
competitiveness and increase their markups. By contrast, if a rm sources a large share of its inputs
internationally (with ϕit  0) and competes in an industry with few foreign rms (Ψ−it ≈ 0), it would
lose competitiveness and thus reduce its markup.
To go from micro to macro, we combine the expressions for ψit for all rms in the industry, as they
are jointly determined in equilibrium, and solve for the aggregate industry ERPT (see Appendix C):
Ψt ≡
N∑
i=1
Sitψit =
1∑N
i=1
Sit
1+Γit/(1−Sit)
N∑
i=1
Sitϕit
1 + Γit/(1− Sit) , (31)
This expression highlights how the cross-rm heterogeneity in {ϕit,Γit, Sit} matters for aggregate
pass-through Ψt. In particular, holding constant the aggregate cost shock, ϕt ≡
∑N
i=1 Sitϕit, the ag-
gregate pass-through into prices is lower (Ψt < ϕt) when larger rms are simultaneously characterized
by stronger strategic complementarities Γit and higher import intensities ϕit. If, instead, for all rms
ϕit ≡ ϕt or Γit ≡ Γ ≥ 0, then Ψt = ϕt, and hence the eect of strategic complementarities washes
out in the aggregate. In what follows, we discipline the joint heterogeneity in {ϕit,Γit, Sit} using the
Belgian data to quantify these eects.
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Figure 1: Markups and pass-through in a calibrated model
Note: Solid blue line corresponds to our benchmark case with Cournot competition, ρ = 10 and η = 1.01. The other lines
correspond to respective departures from the baseline case. Left panel plots markupsMit and right panel plots cost pass-
through elasticity 1/(1+Γit), both as functions of the rm’s market share Sit (see expressions in Section 2.2). In the data,
the market share of the largest rm in a typical industry is around 12%, depicted with a vertical dashed line in the right panel.
4.2 Strategic complementarities in a calibrated model
We solve for an industry equilibrium in the domestic market, in which both domestic and foreign rms
(exporters) compete together, and the costs of the rms follow exogenous processes disciplined by the
data. We analyze simultaneous price setting by rms that are subject to idiosyncratic cost shocks and an
aggregate exchange rate shock, aecting rms with heterogeneous intensities. We calibrate the model
using data on “typical” Belgian manufacturing industries at NACE 4–digit level of aggregation.37
The demand and competition structure of the model are as in Sections 2.2, with strategic com-
plementarities in price setting arising due to oligopolistic (quantity) competition under CES demand,
following Atkeson and Burstein (2008). This model has a number of desirable properties for our anal-
ysis. First, this model, combined with a realistic rm productivity process described below, delivers
the empirically accurate fat-tailed distribution of rm market revenues (Zipf’s law). Second, rms with
larger market shares charge higher markups and adjust them more intensively in response to shocks,
exhibiting greater strategic complementarities in price setting (see Section 2.2 and Figure 1). Third, the
model reproduces a large mass of very small rms that charge nearly constant markups and exhibit
no strategic complementarities, being eectively monopolistic competitors under constant-elasticity
demand. All this is in line with the empirical patterns we document in Section 3.38
37We focus on industries that are important in terms of their overall size and in terms of their share of domestic rms. To
capture “typical” Belgian industries, we select industries based on the following criteria: (i) we start with the top half of the
industries in terms of market size, which together account for over 90% of the total manufacturing sales in Belgium; (ii) out
of these, we drop industries with a foreign share greater than 75% in any one year (a total of 10 such industries); (iii) we drop
industries with less than 10 domestic rms in any one year; and (iv) we drop industries if the largest market share is less
than 2% or greater than 32% (corresponding to the 5th and 95th percentiles respectively). After this process, we end up with
38 industries (out of a total of 166), which account for around half of the total domestic sales.
38We argue, in Appendix D, that jointly matching these features of the data is challenging for alternative models of het-
erogeneous variable markups, based on monopolistic competition and non-CES (e.g., Kimball) demand.
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The empirical success of the Atkeson-Burstein model in matching the rm price behavior relies
on the assumptions of Cournot competition and particular values of demand elasticities. We set the
elasticity of substitution across 4–digit industries to η = 1.01 and within 4–digit industries to ρ = 10.
This is a conventional calibration in the literature following Atkeson and Burstein (2008), as for example
in EMX. In order to reproduce empirical pass-through patterns, the model requires a combination of
Cournot competition, a low (eectively Cobb-Douglas) between-industry elasticity and a high within-
industry elasticity of demand. Under our baseline parameterization, the largest rm in a typical industry
with a market share of 12% has a cost pass-through elasticity of 0.5, and correspondingly a 0.5 strategic
complementarity elasticity, as in this model Γ−it=Γit. This ensures the model replicates the empirical
patterns documented in Section 3, as we show below in Table 9. Yet, any signicant departure from
this parameterization results in a steep drop in the extent of strategic complementarities Γit, as can be
seen in Figure 1, and would lead to the model’s failure in matching the observed empirical patterns.
The marginal cost of a rm is modeled in a similar way as in Section 2.3, with
MCit =
W 1−ϕit
(
V ∗t Et
)ϕi
Ait
, (32)
where the price index of domestic inputsWt and the foreign-currency price index of imported inputsV ∗t
are assumed to be common across rms within an industry. We denote the nominal exchange rate by Et,
andAit is the eective idiosyncratic productivity of the rm, which in addition to physical productivity
captures the idiosyncratic variation in input prices across rms. We further assume that the exchange
rate exposure ϕi ∈ [0, 1] in (32) is rm-specic and constant over time.39 We assume {Wt, V ∗t , Et}
follow exogenous processes, reecting our industry equilibrium focus. In particular, we normalize
Wt ≡ V ∗t ≡ 1, making Et the only source of aggregate shocks, which aects rms with heterogeneous
intensity ϕi, as we describe in detail below. Finally, we assume that the nominal exchange rate follows
a random walk in logs:
et = et−1 + σeut, ut ∼ iid N (0, 1), (33)
where et ≡ log Et and σe is the standard deviation of the exchange rate innovation.
We assume that rm productivitiesAit follow a random growth process, with ait ≡ logAit evolving
according to a random walk with drift µ and a lower reecting barrier at a:
ait = a+ |µ+ ai,t−1 + σavit − a|, vit ∼ iid N (0, 1) (34)
where σa is the standard deviation of the innovation to log productivity. The initial productivities Ai0
are drawn from a Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution function G0(A) = 1−
(
ea/A
)θ ,
where θ is the shape parameter and a is the lower bound parameter. We set µ = −θσ2a/2 < 0 to ensure
that the cross-sectional distribution of productivities stays unchanged over time and given by G0 (see
Gabaix 2009). This completes the specication of the cost processes for the rms. Given the costs, we
calculate the equilibrium market shares and prices according to (13)–(15).
39Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) show that this assumption is empirically justied, as over 85% of variation in import
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Table 6: Parameter values
η ρ θ a µ σa σe
1.01 10 8 0 −0.0036 0.03 0.06
Table 7: Moments across industries
Moment Data Model
1. Number of Belgian rms 41.0 (48.1) 48.0 (48.0)
[ 22.0 — 87.0 ] [ 39.0 — 57.0 ]
2. Foreign share 0.362 (0.377) 0.378 (0.384)
[ 0.139 — 0.611 ] [ 0.237 — 0.538 ]
3. Share of rms from outside EZ 0.081 (0.107) 0.096 (0.115)
[ 0.011 — 0.254 ] [ 0.037 — 0.214 ]
4. Top Belgian rm market share 0.100 (0.117) 0.111 (0.127)
[ 0.049 — 0.209 ] [ 0.058 — 0.214 ]
5. Pareto shape of the sales distribution 1.042 (1.047) 1.045 (1.065)
[ 0.628 — 1.470 ] [ 0.855 — 1.299 ]
6. Standard deviation of ∆Sit 0.0026 (0.0038) 0.0037 (0.0042)
[0.0016 — 0.0077] [0.0026 — 0.0055]
7. Correlation of Sit and Si,t+12 0.898 (0.846) 0.844 (0.808)
[ 0.690 — 0.983 ] [ 0.598 — 0.961 ]
8. Average import intensity, φ¯s 0.301 (0.288) 0.276 (0.282)
[ 0.080 — 0.437 ] [ 0.197 — 0.367 ]
9. Average import intensity outside EZ, φ¯Xs 0.052 (0.069) 0.057 (0.065)
[ 0.009 — 0.161 ] [ 0.031 — 0.111 ]
Note: The table reports median (mean) with [10th—90th percentiles] for the distribution of variables across industries, in the
data and in the simulated model. Foreign share is the sales share of all foreign rms (European and non-European) in the
Belgian market, and the share of the Euro Zone (EZ) rms equals the Foreign share minus Share of rms from outsize EZ
(moment 2 minus moment 3). Average import intensity is the sales weighted import intensity (dened as the cost share of
imported inputs) of the rms within industry; φ¯Es = φ¯s − φ¯Xs is the import intensity from within the EZ.
Table 8: Exchange rate pass-through regressions
Sectoral price indexes Domestic rm-level
∆pst ∆p
D
st ∆p
F
st ∆pit ∆mcit ∆mc
∗
it
Data 0.489 0.311 0.642 0.279 0.395 0.246
(0.061) (0.085) (0.059) (0.187) (0.187) (0.040)
Model 0.447 0.308 0.687 0.306 0.272 0.274
Note: The table reports the coecients from the ERPT regressions of price changes on ∆et (the trade-weighted nominal
exchange rate in the data). In the left panel, ∆pst, ∆pDst, ∆pFst are log changes in price indexes in industry s (market-share
weighted averages) for all, domestic and foreign rms, respectively. In the right panel, we regress log changes in the individual
product prices, marginal costs and imported component of the marginal cost on ∆et, weighting observations by revenues.
The estimates in the model are averaged over 50 simulations, reducing the sampling error to virtually zero. For the regressions
in the data, we report standard errors clustered at the industry level in parenthesis.
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Calibration andmodel t The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 6 and the moments in
the model and the data in Table 7.40 Given the demand elasticities η and ρ, we set the parameters of the
productivity process (θ, a¯, µ, σa) to match the moments of the market share distribution across rms
and their evolution over time (moments 4–7 in Table 7). In particular, given the calibrated number of
rms, a combination of θ and ρ reproduces simultaneously the Zipf’s law in rm sales within industries
and the size of the largest rm across industries, as well as the overall measure of rm concentration.
For example, both in the data and in the model, the largest Belgian rm in an average industry has a
market share of 11–12%, and it varies from 5% to 21% from the 10th to the 90th percentile of industries.41
The choice of a and µ simply ensures that this distribution stays stable over time, and the choice of σa
allows us to match the short-run and long-run persistence of rm market shares (moments 6 and 7).
In a given industry, there are rms of three types: NB domestic Belgian rms, NE foreign Euro-
Zone (EZ) rms, and NX foreign non-EZ rms. Following Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012), the num-
bers of each type of rms across industries are drawn from Poisson distributions with means N¯B , N¯E
and N¯X , respectively. We calibrate N¯B = 48, equal to the average number of Belgian rms across
industries (moment 1 in Table 7). We do not directly observe the numbers of EZ and non-EZ rms in
the Belgian market, and we set N¯E = 21 and N¯X = 9 to match the average sales shares of all products
from these regions, which equal 27% (=38%−11%) and 11% respectively (moments 2 and 3). Upon en-
try, the productivities of rms from each region are drawn from the same distribution G0(A), which
results in the same market share distribution within each rm type, with the dierence across types
summarized by the number of entrants and reected in the cumulative sales shares.42
Turning to the international shock, we assume that the innovation for the exchange rate process
has a standard deviation of σe = 0.06, which closely approximates the dynamics of the Belgian trade-
weighted nominal exchange rate in the data. From equation (32), we see that the exposure to exchange
rate shocks is rm-specic, given by {ϕi}, which we exogenously assign across rms, reproducing the
observed empirical patterns. We assume that all foreign EZ (non-EZ) rms have a common exchange
rate exposure ϕE (ϕX ), with ϕX > ϕE . In contrast, the domestic rms are heterogeneous in their
exchange rate exposure ϕi, which is shaped by their import intensity φi. Specically, we set:
ϕi = φ
E
i χ
E + φXi χ
X + (1− φEi − φXi )χB, (35)
where (φEi , φXi ) are rm-specic import intensities from within and outside the EZ respectively, and
intensity φit is cross-sectional, and within a rm φit is not responsive to exchange rate movements over horizons of 3–5 years.
40To calculate the moments in the model, we simulate a large number of industries (10,000) over 13 years, generating a
panel of rm marginal costs, prices and market shares, akin to the one we have for the Belgian manufacturing sector. Due to
the granularity of rm productivity draws in the model, each simulated industry looks dierent even when we use the same
data generating process for all industries. This enables us to match not only the means and medians across industries, but
also the variation in the moments across industries (see Table 7). For further analysis of the eect of granularity in a related
model see Gaubert and Itskhoki (2015).
41Importantly, the model matches not only the size of the largest rm, but also the spacing of the next rms in the market
share distribution, as reected in the estimated Pareto shape parameters. Both in the data and in the model, we estimate the
shape parameters by running a log(ranki−1/2) on log revenues of rm i for rms with above-median revenues in their
industry, as suggested by Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011).
42Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012) and Gaubert and Itskhoki (2015) provide conditions for an equivalent characterization
in a generalized environment with variable and xed trade costs and under full general equilibrium.
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Table 9: Strategic complementarities in the calibrated model
All rms Bottom 80% vs top 20% of rmsDep. var.: ∆pit Small rms Large rms Interaction
∆mcit 0.737 0.939 — 0.939
∆mcit × Largeit — — 0.643 −0.295
∆p−it 0.261 0.060 — 0.060
∆p−it × Largeit — — 0.357 0.297
Note: The regressions parallel column 4 of Table 1.A and columns 1, 2 and 4 of Table 2. ∆p−it is calculated as in the data
according to (22) and Largeit is a dummy for whether the rm belongs to the top quintile of rms by market shares (i.e., the
largest 20% of rms by sales) within each industry. Observations are weighted by rm sales. All regressions are IV regressions
using rm marginal costs as instruments. Instrumenting using φi∆et results in the same parameter estimates, while OLS
(weighted LS) results in downward biased estimate of strategic complementarities. The reported coecients are averages of
the estimates over 50 simulations, each with 1000 industries, to exclude small sample variation.
(χE , χX , χB) are ERPT elasticities into input prices, including locally-sourced inputs χB , which we
assume to be common across rms and satisfy χX > χE > χB .
We assign (φEi , φXi ) across rms as in the data, using a bootstrap procedure conditional on rm
size, which we describe in Appendix B.1. Table 7 (moments 8 and 9) shows that we match the average
sectoral import intensity, both from within and from outside the Euro Zone. On average, the share of
imported inputs in total costs is around 28%, with about 6% imported from outside the EZ. In addition,
we match the distribution of rm import intensities conditional on rm size.43 This leaves us with ve
parameters to calibrate, (ϕE , ϕX , χE , χX , χB). We choose the values of these parameters to match
the aggregate pass-through elasticities in the data (for trade-weighted exchange rate). We set the pass-
through into domestic input prices at χB =0.1, and the pass-through into both nal and intermediate
goods at χE = ϕE = 0.65 from within the EZ and at χX = ϕX = 1 from outside the EZ. This allows
us to match the empirical pass-through patterns into the industry price indexes for all rms combined,
and domestic and foreign rms separately, as we report in the left panel of Table 8. This calibration
is also consistent with the pass-through patterns into micro product-level prices and marginal costs
of the Belgian rms (right panel of Table 8), as well as the aggregate ERPT into import prices (see
Appendix B.1). This completes the calibration of the model.
Strategic complementarities Before turning to counterfactuals, we verify that the calibrated model
reproduces the empirical patterns of strategic complementarities in price setting. We show this by
rerunning our main empirical specications of Section 3 on the data simulated from the model and
report the results in Table 9. In parallel with our baseline Tables 1 and 2, we regress the rm’s price on
its marginal cost and competitor prices (all in log changes). We do it rst for the full sample of rms, then
separately for the 80% of the smallest rms and 20% of the largest rms by sales within each industry,
and nally pooling all rms and introducing an interaction dummy for large rms. Table 9 shows that
43In particular, rm import intensity φi ≡ φEi + φXi has a correlation of 0.25 with rm market share, while the relative
share of non-EZ imports φXi /φi does not systematically correlate with rm market share (see Appendix B.1).
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the model nails the coecients on ∆mcit, both for the full sample of rms and for the sub-samples of
small and large rms, as well as the lack of strategic complementarities for the small rms, but slightly
under-predicts the strategic complementarity elasticity for the large rms (0.36 versus 0.42=0.06+0.36
in column 4 of Table 2).44 This conrms that the model captures the salient features of price setting in
the data, and can be used for counterfactual analysis.
4.3 Exchange rate and domestic prices
We use the calibrated model to explore the impulse response of an economy to a 10% exchange rate
devaluation, with a particular emphasis on the role of markups in shaping the price responses. The
model is calibrated to reproduce the average ERPT into domestic prices of 32%. Although this number
may seem high, and is probably explained by the above-average openness of the Belgian economy, the
underlying mechanisms driving ERPT are common across countries. That is, price setting of domes-
tic rms responds to an exchange rate shock through two channels: the marginal cost channel due to
imported inputs and the strategic complementarities (markup) channel due to competition from the
foreign rms. By decomposing the aggregate ERPT into these channels by types of rms and study-
ing the heterogeneity of responses across industries with dierent characteristics, we gain important
insights into understanding the dierential aggregate ERPT across countries.
Decomposing ERPT Table 10 decomposes the ERPT into the marginal cost and markup channel by
rm type. For the domestic rms, the large rms exhibit a higher ERPT relative to the small rms (36%
versus 24%). This dierence is due to both a greater response of their marginal costs (as large rms are
45% more import intensive) and markup adjustment, with the markup adjustment playing a relatively
bigger role for the large rms: 11% versus 5.5%. This dierence is, nonetheless, small, which might seem
surprising in light of the large dierence in the strength of strategic complementarities between the two
types of rms in Table 9 (indeed, a six-fold dierence). A closer inspection of equation (30) provides
the explanation. While large rms have a much higher Γit, a devaluation also leads to substantial
increases in their marginal costs because of their high import intensity. As a result, with ϕit only
slightly lower than Ψt, the markup adjustment by large rms is limited. The small rms exhibit almost
no strategic complementarities (Γit ≈ 0) and barely adjust markups.45 Therefore, the marginal cost
channel dominates the markup channel for the price adjustment of both small and large rms, but for
dierent reasons. Hence, at the aggregate, the markup response of domestic rms is muted, and the
markup channel accounts for less than 10% of the overall ERPT into domestic rm prices.
44Given the empirical standard errors, this is not a statistically signicant dierence. Note that in the model, the sum of the
coecients on marginal cost and competitor price is exactly 1, while in the data the two point estimates sum to 1.07, which
explains why the model cannot perfectly match both elasticities. Appendix Figure A1 further illustrates the pass-through
and strategic complementarity elasticities across rms by market share bins: the model predicts strategic complementarity
elasticities as large as 50% for rms with market shares over 10% within their industries, but such rms are rare, as in the data.
45A back-of-the envelope calculation based on (30) suggests that the markup response for the large rms should be Γit/(1+
Γit) · [Ψ−it − ϕit] ≈ 0.36 · (0.46− 0.32) = 0.05, consistent with what we nd in Table 10 (i.e., 0.36·0.11=0.04). Appendix
Figure A2 illustrates the decomposition of domestic rm ERPT into the marginal cost and markup components by more
disaggregated bins of rm size, and we nd that for the largest few rms the markup adjustment can account for as much as
a quarter of the overall ERPT.
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Table 10: ERPT. Decomposition
Domestic rms Foreign All
All Small Large rms rms
Price ERPT 0.319 0.236 0.361 0.680 0.459
Percentage contribution:
— marginal cost 90.3 94.5 88.9 110.9 102.0
— markup 9.7 5.5 11.1 −10.9 −2.0
Note: The table reports average ERPT into domestic industry prices, and its decomposition into the marginal cost and markup
contributions (in percent), by types of rms. Large rms dened as before, above the 80th percentile of sales within industry
(corresponding to a 1.4% market share cuto), with the 20% of the largest rms accounting for 65% of sales. ERPT coecients
are impulse responses, obtained by averaging over 50 two-period simulations with 200 industries each, with only a 10%
exchange rate devaluation between the two periods and no productivity innovations over initial draws. Price and marginal
cost are industry indexes (sales weighted averages of log price and marginal cost changes, respectively) and the industry
markup index equals the dierence between the price and the marginal cost indexes (in log changes).
For the foreign rms, we note from Table 10 that they reduce markups in response to an exchange
rate devaluation, while the domestic rms increase markups, consistent with the conventional view.
Interestingly, the overall markup response in the industry (taking together all domestic and foreign
rms) is close to zero, in parallel with the ndings in ACDR in the context of a dierent model and
parameterization. In our case, however, this nding is not a robust feature of the theoretical mecha-
nism, and changes substantially across calibrations. The aggregate markup can increase or decrease in
response to an exchange rate shock, depending on the cost and competition structure of the industry,
as we show in our counterfactual analysis below.
Heterogeneity across industries In our simulation, the aggregate ERPT into domestic rm prices
varies from 26% to 37% from the 10th to the 90th percentile of industries, with a 32% ERPT for the median
industry. To understand what is driving these dierential eects, we regress industry level ERPT into
domestic prices on industry characteristics. From column 1 in Table 11, we see that the industry’s
overall import intensity (i.e., the sales-weighted import intensity of individual domestic rms) explains
over three quarters of the variation in ERPT across industries, supporting our nding in Table 10 that
the marginal cost channel (in particular, through imported intermediates) dominates the overall price
adjustment by the domestic rms. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 11 reinforce this result: once we control
for the fraction of imports outside the Euro Zone and the distribution of import intensities across rms
within industry, the explanatory power for pass-through variation reaches 87%.
Note from column 3 that a strong positive correlation between import intensity and market share,
holding overall import intensity constant, reduces the industry’s ERPT. This is in line with the logic of
equation (30), as in this case the large rms are hit harder by exchange rate shocks, and consequently
increase their markups less, if at all, resulting in lower pass-through. A one-standard-deviation increase
in this correlation reduces the industry ERPT by a quarter of a standard deviation. This highlights the
role of the within-industry heterogeneity for the aggregate pass-through patterns, following the logic
of equation (31).
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Table 11: ERPT. Variation across industries
Dep. var.: ΨDs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average import intensity 0.887 0.839 0.913 0.871
Import intensity outside EZ 0.077 0.113 0.103
Correlation φBi and Si −0.294 −0.240
Foreign share 0.324 0.222
Top domestic rm market share 0.516 0.227
R2 0.786 0.790 0.866 0.177 0.905
Note: The table reports the standardized coecients and R2s from the regression of industry ERPT elasticity into domestic
prices (ΨDs ) on various industry-level variables. Each standardized coecient shows the eect of a one standard deviation
increase of the predictor on the change in ΨDs measured in units of standard deviations. The correlation between φBi and Si
is the within-industry correlation between the overall rm import intensity and its market share. The other variables are as
dened in Table 7. The sampling is as described in Table 10.
Another notable dierence across industries is the large variation in the degree of foreign compe-
tition (see Table 7, moments 2). In column 4 of Table 11, we nd rather surprisingly that this variation
explains less than 18% of the variation in ERPT, with one standard deviation increase in the foreign
share accounting for only a third of a standard deviation increase in the industry’s ERPT. Since the
foreign share aects the ERPT into domestic prices only indirectly, through the markup adjustment
of the domestic rms, this pattern is again in line with our earlier nding of the limited role of the
markup channel for the domestic rms. Note that in this regression we also control for the size of the
largest domestic rm in the industry. The presence of very large rms in the industry results in a higher
aggregate ERPT, as these rms are both more import intensive and increase their markups when the
exchange rate depreciates.46 This again emphasizes the role of the within-industry heterogeneity for
the aggregate pass-through patterns. Combining all explanatory variables together in column 5, we
nd that they jointly account for over 90% of the variation in ERPT across industries.47
Counterfactual industries We now assess when markup adjustment is important in driving aggre-
gate ERPT by considering a set of industries that are not typical in Belgium, but may be typical in other
countries. We consider three dierent sets of counterfactual industries. First, we consider industries
with no foreign competition (i.e., zero foreign share), while in the Belgian data the foreign share is 14%
at the 10th percentile of industries (Table 7, moment 2). We leave the cost structure of the domestic rms
as in the baseline calibration. The left panel of Table 12 shows that the absence of foreign competition
reverses the direction of the markup channel eect of the price response to the exchange rate shocks,
46Without controlling for the presence of large rms, the foreign share loses its explanatory power altogether, as a high
foreign share correlates simultaneously with the importance of foreign competition and a lack of large domestic rms, which
as we discussed have osetting eects on the ERPT into domestic rms.
47While the relationship between ERPT and these industry characteristics is very pronounced, detecting it empirically is
dicult, as the measures of ERPT by industry are very noisy. Indeed, even in the simulated model, when we reintroduce
productivity shocks, the exchange rate shocks account for only a small variation in rm prices and price indexes across
industries. As a result, the explanatory power in the regression in column 5 of Table 11 falls from 90% to 10%. This makes it
virtually impossible to estimate this relationship in the data, thus requiring a model-based analysis.
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Table 12: ERPT. Counterfactuals
No Foreign Competition Large Foreign Share No Foreign Inputs
All Small Large All Small Large All Small Large
Price ERPT 0.266 0.226 0.292 0.391 0.240 0.447 0.161 0.114 0.185
Percentage contribution:
— marginal cost 106.0 98.7 109.9 76.0 93.3 72.5 62.1 87.7 54.1
— markup −6.0 1.3 −9.9 24.0 6.7 27.5 37.9 12.3 45.9
Note: The Table reports analogous results that parallel those in the Domestic rms columns of Table 10 (see table notes for
details), for counterfactual sets of industries (as described in the text).
leaving only the marginal cost channel to push prices up. The resulting ERPT into domestic rm prices
is 27% versus 32% in the baseline calibration (see Table 10), and the dierence in these coecients is
almost entirely accounted for by the dierential markup adjustment of the large rms (a negative 10%
contribution versus a positive 11% in the baseline). Interestingly, an exchange rate devaluation results
in a reduction of the aggregate markup, in contrast with the conventional wisdom (see Section 4.1).
This is because the small rms do not adjust markups due to the lack of strategic complementarities,
while the large rms adjust markups downwards in response to a shock that adversely aects their
costs. According to (30), this is the case with ϕi > Ψ−i for the large rms, which implies a reduction in
their markups. This illustrates that the direction of the markup adjustment by the large rms depends
on whether their average competitor is a small domestic rm or a foreign rm.
Second, the middle panel of Table 12, in contrast, analyzes industries with a large foreign share
equal to 67%, as opposed to 61% in the data at the 90th percentile of industries (and 38% for the average
industry). We again leave the cost structure of the domestic rms unchanged, and the greater pass-
through in this case is fully due to a stronger response of markups, as the typical competitor in the
industry is now a foreign rm, heavily exposed to the exchange rate shocks. The overall ERPT into
domestic rm prices increases from 32% to 39%, with a quarter of the overall ERPT now due to markups
(versus 10% in the baseline). Again, all of the dierential response is driven by the large rms, for which
the markup adjustment now accounts for 28% of the price response (versus 11% in the baseline).
Third, the right panel of Table 12, considers industries in which foreign competition is the same as
in the baseline calibration, but domestic rms do not source any inputs internationally, while in the
data import intensity is 8% at the 10th percentile of industries (Table 7, moment 8). This case corre-
sponds to the many stylized theoretical models of pricing-to-market, which assume no international
input sourcing. In this case, the ERPT into marginal costs equals χB = 0.1 for all domestic rms in-
dependently of size, and all of the heterogeneity in their overall price adjustment is accounted for by
changes in markups in response to foreign competitor price changes. The small rms exhibit little
strategic complementarities and thus barely change their markups. In contrast, the large rms increase
their markups substantially, accounting for almost a half of their overall ERPT (in comparison with
11% in the baseline). At the aggregate, the markup now accounts for almost 40% of the overall price
adjustment to an exchange rate shock.48 The overall ERPT into domestic prices in this case is only 16%,
48In fact, there are two features of this counterfactual which increase the role of the markup adjustment by domestic rms:
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much lower than the average for Belgian manufacturing.
In sum, this section shows how the structure of foreign competition and the joint distribution of
market shares and import intensities across domestic rms determine the importance of markup ad-
justment for aggregate exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a direct estimate of strategic complementarities in price setting. We nd that
a rm increases its price by an average of 3.5% in response to a 10% increase in the prices of its competi-
tors, holding its own marginal cost constant. Furthermore, there is vast heterogeneity in the strength
of strategic complementarities across rms. The small rms show no strategic complementarities and
a complete pass-through of their cost shocks into prices, behaving as CES monopolistic competitors.
In contrast, the large rms exhibit strong strategic complementarities and incomplete pass-through.
We estimate these elasticities within a general theoretical framework, using a new rich micro dataset
with detailed information on rm marginal costs and competitor prices. We develop an instrumental
variable identication strategy to estimate the important properties of rm markups without imposing
strong structural assumption on demand, competition or production.
Our empirical estimates provide the key ingredients necessary to analyze the transmission of an
aggregate international shock into domestic prices. In particular, we study the counterfactual response
of an economy to an exchange rate devaluation, using a calibrated model of variable markups that is
tightly disciplined by the joint distribution of rm import intensities and market shares in the data.
For a typical Belgian manufacturing industry, we nd a limited role for the markup adjustment in
shaping the response of domestic prices to an exchange rate shock, despite the substantial strategic
complementarities in price setting characteristic of the large domestic rms. This nding is due to the
unusually high openness of the Belgian market in intermediate inputs. In particular, the Belgian rms’
high import-intensive cost structure makes them directly exposed to the exchange rate uctuations
and thus dilutes any competitive edge they would otherwise have over foreign competitors following
an exchange rate devaluation. However, this is not the case for all industries. Indeed, we nd that the
markup adjustment accounts for a substantial portion of exchange rate pass-through in industries with
low import intensity (as well as a low correlation of import intensity with rm size) and with greater
foreign competition. These results help explain why dierent studies for dierent countries produce
wildly dierent ERPT estimates, and provide a path to understanding how aggregate domestic prices
respond to international shocks.
(i) the lower average import intensity of domestic rms, which renders them more competitive relative to foreign rms when
exchange rate depreciates; and (ii) the lack of correlation between exchange rate exposure and rm size, which increases
average markup adjustment (recall the analysis following Table 11). We also carry out two additional counterfactuals. First,
we assign a common import intensity equal to the average of 0.282 to all domestic rms independently of size, which results
in a 14% contribution of markup to ERPT relative 9.7% in the baseline. Second, we make all small rms non-importers and
proportionally increase the import intensity of large rms to keep the average industry import intensity constant at 0.282. In
this case, the domestic markups stay eectively unchanged, as the large domestic rms gain no competitive grounds against
foreign rms.
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A Additional Empirical and Quantitative Results
Table A1: Summary Statistics
Level Variable 5 pctl Mean Median 95 pctl St.dev.
Firm-product ∆pit −0.363 0.013 0.003 0.400 0.235
∆p−it −0.061 0.012 0.008 0.093 0.054
Sit 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.044 0.039
Firm
Lit 9.9 168.9 36.1 666.8 515.1
∆mcit −0.262 0.022 0.015 0.330 0.212
∆mc∗it −0.030 0.002 0.000 0.041 0.029
φit 0.000 0.148 0.109 0.452 0.156
φxeuit 0.000 0.032 0.003 0.168 0.071
# of rms 6 65 40 310 80
Industry maxSit 0.013 0.098 0.063 0.313 0.110
(NACE 4-digit) SDst 0.111 0.565 0.588 0.901 0.238
SFst 0.080 0.369 0.315 0.864 0.236
Notes: The table reports percentiles, means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the analysis, as dened
in the text. Additionally: Lit denotes rm employment; φit and φxeuit are the rm import intensities (shares in total variable
costs) for intermediate inputs from outside Belgium and from outside the euro zone respectively (see also Table A2 below);
maxSit is the largest market share of a domestic (Belgian) rm within an industry; andSDst andSFst are the cumulative market
shares of domestic (Belgian) and foreign products within industry s. The statistics characterize our sample distributions across
observations, which are at the rm-product-year level, except the industry variables which are at the industry-year levels.
Table A2: Import intensity by rm size
All Large Small
Fraction φit > 0 0.701 0.984 0.638
Average φit 0.150 0.221 0.134
Fraction φxeuit > 0 0.576 0.958 0.491
Average φxeuit 0.032 0.059 0.026
Note: The reported averages are across rm-year observations, explaining the
dierence with the rst column from the corresponding entries in Table A1.
Large (small) rms are rms with average employment of at least (less than) 100
employees. Over 95% of large rms import intermediate inputs from outside
euro area, while 49.1% of small rms import from outside the euro area and
63.8% import from outside of Belgium.
Table A3: Robustness: large and small rms
Sample Large Small
Export share < 0.1 FDI share < 0.005 φi > 0 φxeui > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆mcit 0.648∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.220) (0.158) (0.166)
∆p−it 0.441∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.036 0.012
(0.187) (0.188) (0.202) (0.211)
# obs. 7,941 14,389 32,984 25,900
Notes: Large and small sample based on employment=100 threshhold. Column 1 only includes large rms with export
shares less than 10%. Column 2 only includes large rms with foreign sales or purchases less than 0.005% of their total sales.
Column 3 (4) only includes rms with positive imports of intermediates from outside Belgium (Eurozone).
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Market share bins (%)
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Figure A1: Marginal costs vs strategic complementarities, by rm size
Note: The red and blue bars depict coecients ψit = 1/(1 + Γit) and γit = Γ−it/(1 + Γit) from the main regression
specication (17), estimated by bins of rms with similar market shares (unweighted), using the model-simulated dataset.
The gure expands on the heterogeneity analysis reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 9. The x-axis indicates the market
share bins, where the numbers correspond to market share intervals: [0, 0.5%), [0.5%, 1%), .., [25%, 50%]. The bin cutos
were chosen to keep all bins of comparable size (both in terms of number of rms and in terms of sales): the bin of the smallest
rms with market share below 0.5% contains 30% of rms, which however account for only 7% of sales; the bin of the largest
rms contains 0.1% of rms, but they account for over 2% of sales; other bins account for between 8% and 15% of sales.
Market share bins (%)
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Figure A2: ERPT into rm prices, by rm size. Marginal cost vs markup channels
Note: Regressions of log change in rm marginal costs (red bars) and prices (sum of red and blue bars, where blue bars
measure ERPT into rm markups) on log change in the exchange rate for the counterfactual exercise of Section 4.3, by bins of
rms with similar market shares (as described in Figure A1 above). The gure expands on the heterogeneity analysis reported
in columns 2 and 3 of Table 10. Dashed line indicates the average pass-through across all rms.
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B Data Appendix
Data Sources The production data (PRODCOM) report production values and quantities at the rm-
product level in the manufacturing sector, where the product is dened at the PC 8-digit. It is a survey
of all rms with a minimum of 10 employees, covering at least 90% of production in each NACE 4-digit
(that is, the rst 4 digits of the PC 8-digit code), which includes around 1,700 manufacturing product
codes in any one year. We only keep PC codes that are classied as manufactured goods - these are
products for which the rst 4-digits of the PC8 codes are in the range of 1500 to 3699. We drop all
PC8 codes in petroleum (NACE 2-digit code 23) and industrial services. Firms are required to report
total values and quantities but are not required to report the breakdown between domestic and exports.
Therefore, to get a measure of domestic values and quantities we merge on the export data from customs
and subtract total export values and quantities from total production values and quantities sold.
The international data comprise transactions on intra-EU trade data collected by the Intrastat In-
quiry and the extra-EU transactions data by Customs. These data are reported at the rm level by
destination and source country for each product classied at the 8-digit combined nomenclature (CN)
in values and quantities, with around 10,000 distinct products. The rst 6-digits of the CN codes cor-
respond to the World Harmonized System (HS). All transactions that involve a change of "ownership
with compensation" (codes 1 and 11) are in our sample. These data include all extra-EU transactions
of rms with trade greater than 1,000 euros or whose weights are more than 1,000 kilograms - these
thresholds were reduced in 2006; and intra-EU trade with a higher threshold of 250,000 euros, with both
these thresholds raised somewhat in 2006.
The rm characteristics data are available on an annual frequency at the rm level, with each rm
reporting their main economic activity within a 5-digit NACE industry. However, there is no product
level data within rms available from this source.
Merging the trade and production data The production and trade data are easily merged using a
unique rm identier. But the merging of the rm’s products in the production and customs data is a
bit more complicated.
First, we had to aggregate the monthly PRODCOM data to the annual frequency. To avoid large
jumps in annual values due to nonreporting for some months by some rms, we only keep a rm’s
observation in year t if there was positive production reported for at least one product in each month.
In some cases the rm reported positive values but the quantities were missing. For these cases, in order
to construct domestic unit values we impute the quantity sold from the average value to quantity ratio in
the months where both values and quantities were reported - this only aected 3% of the observations,
accounting for 1% of the production value. With this adjustment, we aggregated the data to the annual
level.
Second, there is the task of converting the highly disaggregated trade data that is at the CN 8-
digit level with the more aggregated PC 8-digit PC codes. To match these two datasets, we use the
concordance provided by Eurostat - these mappings may be one-to-one, many-to-one, one-to-many,
or many-to-many. We use the les developed by Van Beveren, Bernard, and Vandenbussche (2012) to
identify these mappings. While CN-to-PC conversion is straightforward for one-to-one and many-to-
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one mappings, conversion for one-to-many and many-to-many mappings required grouping of some
PC codes. There were 77 such groupings, which account for approximately 4% of the observations and
production value.
Third, in order to construct the domestic unit values, where we net out exports from total production
values and quantities, we need to ensure that the quantities in the two datasets are comparable. So we
drop observations where the units that match in the two datasets are less than 95% of the total export
value and the rm’s export share is greater than 5% within a rm-PC-year observation. The rationale for
doing this is that if the export share (exports as a ratio of production) is really small then the domestic
unit value won’t be aected very much if we don’t subtract all of the rm’s exports.
Fourth, some PC codes change over time. Here, we only make an adjustment if the code is a one-to-
one change between two years. We do not take into account changes in PC codes that involve splitting
into multiple codes or multiple PC codes combining into one code. Eectively, these changes in the PC
codes are treated as though they are new products.
B.1 Calibration of rm import intensity
We describe here our bootstrap procedure for calibrating the import intensity φi of the Belgian rms.
In the initial period, we draw for each rm a vector of the cost share of EZ and non-EZ imported
inputs (φEi , φXi ), such that the overall import intensity of the rm is φi = φEi + φXi . To do so, in each
industry we rank rms by productivity in descending order. We pick one of the Belgian industries in
our sample (see footnote 37) at random with replacement, and rank all rms there as well. We assign φi
of the top rm in the simulated industry to equal that in the randomly chosen Belgian industry. For the
second rm, we take φi for the second rm in another randomly drawn Belgian industry. We continue
this procedure for the rst 20 rms in each simulated industry. For the remaining rms (number 21
onwards), we assign either zero import intensity (with the same probability as in the data for the small
rms, specically 45%) or the average import intensity of the importing small rms in a randomly
chosen industry. We repeat this procedure for each of the simulated industries. Upon assigning φi to
every rm in the simulation, we determine φXi of the rms, by drawing an importing rm at random
from all industries in the data and using its φXi /φi ratio. This procedure is motivated by the fact that
the φXi /φi ratio in the data is not systematically correlated with rm size. Lastly, φEi = φi − φXi is
determined as a residual. We show that this procedure results in the same cross-industry distribution of
average industry import intensities (overall and from outsize the EZ) as in the data (Table 7, moments
8 and 9). It also captures the correlation between rm import intensities and market shares.
Lastly, we comment on the choice of (ϕE , ϕX , χE , χX). In the data, the pass-through elasticities
into Belgian import prices are 0.83 and 0.82 for the nal goods and intermediate inputs respectively,
which discipline the average magnitude of (ϕE , ϕX) and (χE , χX) respectively. For nal goods, the
import price pass-through from within the EZ and outside the EZ are 0.70 and 0.91 respectively, while
for the intermediate goods these elasticities are 0.49 and 1.30, with much larger standard errors. To
broadly match these numbers, we choose ϕE = χE = 0.65 and ϕX = χX = 1. This calibration also
ensures the t of the pass-through moments in Table 8.
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C Derivations and Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider the prot maximization problem of the rm written in the conjectural
variation form:
max
pi,p−i
{
exp
{
pi + qi(pi,p−i; ξ)
}− TCi( exp{qi(pi,p−i; ξ)})∣∣∣ s.t h−i(pi,p−i; ξ) = 0}, (A1)
where pi and qi are log price and log quantity demanded of the rm, TCi(·) is the total cost function (in
levels), and h−i(·) is the conjectural variation vector function with elements given by hij(·) for j 6= i;
we omit t subscript for brevity. Note that this formulation nests monopolistic competition, oligopolistic
Bertrand competition, and oligopolistic Cournot competition, as long as the demand system is invert-
ible. In particular, to capture rm behavior under monopolistic and oligopolistic Bertrand competition,
we choose the conjectural variation function:
h−i(pi,p−i; ξ) = p−i − p∗−i. (A2)
Indeed, this corresponds to the assumption of the rm that its price choice pi leads to no adjustment
in the prices of its competitors which are set at p−i = p∗−i. The case of Cournot competition requires
choosing h−i(·) such that it implies q−i ≡ q∗−i for some given q∗−i vector. Provided an invertible
demand system, this can be simply ensured by choosing:
h−i(pi,p−i; ξ) = −
(
q−i
(
pi,p−i; ξ
)− q∗−i). (A3)
Therefore, we can capture the rm behavior under competition in both prices and quantities with a
conditional prot maximization with respect to prices (A1).
We introduce the following notation:
1. epi+qiλij for j 6= i is the set of Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in (A1);
2. ζijk(p; ξ) ≡ ∂hij(p; ξ)/∂pk is the elasticity of the conjectural variation function, with ζijj(·) > 0
as a normalization and the matrix {ζijk(·)}j,k 6=i having full rank, which is trivially the case
for (A2) and is satised for (A3) due to the assumption of demand invertibility;
3. i(p; ξ) ≡ −∂qi(p; ξ)/pi > 0 and δij(p; ξ) ≡ ∂qi(p; ξ)/pj for j 6= i are the own and cross price
elasticities of demand.
We can then write the rst-order conditions for (A1), after simplication, as:
(
1− i + ie−µi
)
+
∑
k 6=i λikζiki = 0,
∀j 6= i (−δij + δije−µi)+∑
k 6=i λikζikj = 0,
where µi ≡ pi − mci is the log markup and mci ≡ log(∂TCi/∂Qi) is the log marginal cost. Using
these conditions to solve out the Lagrange multipliers, we obtain the expression for the optimal markup
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of the rm:
µi = log
σi
σi − 1 , (A4)
where σi is the perceived elasticity of demand given by (using vector notation):
σi ≡ i − ζ′iZ−1i δi, (A5)
where ζi ≡ {ζiji}j 6=i and δi ≡ {δij}j 6=i are (N − 1)× 1 vectors and Zi ≡ {ζijk}j 6=i,k 6=i is (N − 1)×
(N −1) matrix of cross-price elasticities, which has full rank (under the market competition structures
we consider) due to the demand invertibility assumption.
Recall that ζijk, i and δij are all functions of (p; ξ), and therefore σi ≡ σi(p; ξ). Consequently,
(A4) denes the log markup function:
Mi(p; ξ) ≡ log σi(p; ξ)
σi(p; ξ)− 1 ,
and the optimal price of the rm solves the following xed point equation:
p˜i =Mi(p˜i,p−i; ξ) +mci
completing the proof of Proposition 1. 
We can now discuss a number of special cases. First, in the case of monopolistic competition and
oligopolistic price (Bertrand) competition, for which the conjecture function satises (A2), and there-
fore ζijj ≡ 1, ζiji = 0 for j 6= i and ζijk ≡ 0 for k 6= j, i. This implies thatZi is an identity matrix and
ζi ≡ 0, substituting which into (A5) results in:
σi = i(p; ξ) = −∂qi(p; ξ)
∂pi
. (A6)
In words, the perceived elasticity of demand in this case simply equals the partial price elasticity of the
residual demand of the rm.
In the case of oligopolistic quantity (Cournot) competition, we have ζijk = j for k = j and
ζijk = −δjk for j 6= k. Therefore, in this case we can rewrite (A5) as in footnote 9:
σi = i(p; ξ)−
∑
j 6=i δij(p; ξ)κij(p; ξ), (A7)
where κi = {κij}j 6=i solves
κi = ζ
′
iZ
−1
i =
{
dpj
dpi
∣∣∣
dqj(p;ξ)=0,j 6=i
}
j 6=i
.
This is easy to verify by writing the system dqj(p; ξ) =
∑
k 6=j
∂qj(p;ξ)
∂pk
dpk = 0 for all j 6= i in matrix
form and solving it for κij = dpj/dpi, which results in κi = ζ′iZ−1i .
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Proof of Proposition 2 If qi = qi(pi, z; ξ), then following the same steps as above, we can show that
there exists a markup function:
µi =Mi(pi, z; ξ) ≡ log σi(pi, z; ξ)
σi(pi, z; ξ)− 1 ,
such that the prot-maximizing price of the rm solves p˜i = mci +Mi(p˜i, z; ξ). Using the denition
of the competitor price change index (7) and the properties of the log expenditure function z = z(p; ξ),
we have:
ωij =
∂Mi(pi, z; ξ)/∂pj∑
k 6=i ∂Mi(pi, z; ξ)/∂pk
=
∂Mi(pi, z; ξ)/∂z · Sj
∂Mi(pi, z; ξ)/∂z ·
∑
k 6=i Sk
=
Sj
1− Si ,
where we make use of the Shephard’s lemma (Envelope condition) for the log expenditure function
∂z/∂pj = Sj and
∑
k 6=i Sk = 1− Si. Consequently, the competitor price index is given by (9).
If a stronger condition σi = σi(pi − z; ξ) is satised, then:
µi =Mi(pi − z; ξ) ≡ log σi(pi − z; ξ)
σi(pi − z; ξ)− 1 ,
and, using the denitions of Γi and Γ−i in (6), we have:
Γi = −dMi(pi − z; ξ)
dpi
= −∂Mi(pi − z; ξ)
∂pi
− ∂Mi(pi − z; ξ)
∂z
∂z
∂pi
= −∂Mi(pi − z; ξ)
∂(pi − z) (1− Si),
Γ−i =
∑
j 6=i
∂Mi(pi − z; ξ)
∂pj
=
∂Mi(pi − z; ξ)
∂z
∑
j 6=i Sj = Γi.
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Note that condition in (ii) in the proposition is stronger than the condition in (i), as σi(p; ξ) =
−∂qi(p; ξ)/∂pi, and therefore if σi = σi(pi − z; ξ) then necessarily qi = qi(pi, z; ξ). It is easy to see
that the converse is not true, for example if qi(pi, z; ξ) is not homothetic of degree one in the levels of
(pi, z).
Derivations for the Atkeson-Burstein model Instead of following the standard approach, we derive
the results for the Atkeson-Burstein model using the more general Propositions 1 and 2, and their proofs
above. We rewrite the demand schedule (12) in logs:49
qi = log ξi + ds + (ρ− η)z − ρpi, (A8)
49Note that ds = logDs and, with nested CES, Ds = $sY/P , where $s is the exogenous industry demand shifter, Y is
the nominal income in the economy and P is the log aggregate price index, so that Y/P is the real income in the economy,
and no rm is large enough to aect Y/P .
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where the log industry price index
z =
1
1− ρ log
∑N
i=1
exp{log ξi + (1− ρ)pi} (A9)
can be veried to also be the log expenditure function. In particular, the Shephard’s lemma follows
directly from (A9):
∂z
∂pi
= elog ξi+(1−ρ)(pi−z) =
epi+qi∑N
j=1 e
pj+qj
= Si,
where the second equality uses demand equation (A8) and the last equality is the denition of the
revenue market share Si. Furthermore, we can use this result to decompose the change in the industry
price index as follows:50
dz =
∑N
j=1
Sjdpj = Sidpi + (1− Si)dp−i, where dp−i ≡
∑
j 6=i
Sj
1− Sidpj ,
which corresponds to the index of competitor price changes in (9).
We now calculate σi for both cases of Bertrand and Cournot competition:
1. Price competition (Bertrand) Recall from (A6) that under Bertrand competition, we simply
have σi = i, where
i = −dqi
dpi
= ρ− (ρ− η)elog ξi+(1−ρ)(pi−z),
and therefore the conditions for the both part of Proposition 2 apply in this case. Therefore, we
can rewrite:
i = ρ− (ρ− η)Si = ρ(1− Si) + ηSi. (A10)
Taking stock, we have i = (pi − z; ξi) given the parameters of the model (ρ, η), and
µi = µ(pi − z; ξi) = log (pi − z; ξi)
(pi − z; ξi)− 1 .
Using the steps of the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 2, we can calculate:
Γi = −dµi
dpi
= −∂µi
∂pi
− ∂µi
∂z
Si =
(ρ− η)(ρ− 1)Si(1− Si)
i(i − 1) ,
Γ−i =
∂µi
∂z
· (1− Si) = Γi.
2. Quantity competition (Cournot) Next consider the case of Cournot competition. Here we
follow the steps of the proof of Proposition 1, and rst calculate:
δij =
dqi
dpj
=
∂qi
∂z
∂z
∂pj
= (ρ− η)Sj and ζijk =
[
j = ρ− (ρ− η)Sj , if k = j,
−δjk = −(ρ− η)Sj , if k 6= j.
50In fact, in this case, such decomposition is also available for the level of the price index, which is a special property in
the CES case: Z =
[
ξiP
1−ρ
i + (1− ξi)P 1−ρ−i
]1/(1−ρ) and P−i = [∑j 6=i ξj/(1− ξi)P 1−ρj ]1/(1−ρ).
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We could directly use this to solve for ζ′iZ−1i δi in (A5). Instead, we calculate κi = ζ
′
iZ
−1
i , where
the elements are κij = dpj/dpi
∣∣
dqk=0,k 6=i. We do this by noting that:
dqj = (ρ− η)dz − ρdpj = 0, j 6= i,
implies dpj = (ρ− η)/ρ · dz for all j 6= i. This makes it easy to solve for dz as a function of dpi:
dz =
∑
j
Sjdpj = Sidpi +
ρ− η
ρ
(1− Si)dz ⇒ dz
dpi
=
ρSi
ρ− (ρ− η)(1− Si) ,
and the expressions for κij = dpj/dpi = (ρ − η)Si/[ρ − (ρ − η)(1 − Si)] for all j 6= i follow.
Substituting this into (A7), we have:
σi = i −
∑
j 6=i δijκij = [ρ− (ρ− η)Si]−
(ρ− η)2Si
ρ− (ρ− η)(1− Si)
∑
j 6=i
Sj
= ρ− (ρ− η)Si
[
1 +
(ρ− η)(1− Si)
ρ− (ρ− η)(1− Si)
]
=
ρη
ρSi + η(1− Si) =
[
1
ρ
(1− Si) + 1
η
Si
]−1
,
replicating (15), which is the conventional expression from Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Again,
we have σi = σi(pi − z; ξi) and µi =Mi(pi − z, ξi) = log[σi(pi − z; ξi)/(σi(pi − z; ξi) − 1)],
satisfying the conditions in both parts of Proposition 2. The remaining derivations are straight-
forward, and the resulting expressions are provided in the text.
Note the qualitative similarity between the price and quantity oligopolistic competition, where in the
former σi is a simple average of ρ and η with a weight Si on ρ, and in the latter σi is a corresponding
harmonic average, with the same monotonicity properties, given the values of ρ and η. In both cases,
Γi = Γ−i = Γ(Si), which is a monotonically increasing function of Si at least on Si ∈ [0, 0.5] for any
values of the parameters.
Reduced-form of the model We start with the price decomposition (5) and, under the assumptions of
Propositions 2, solve for the reduced form of the model. First, we rewrite (5) as:[
1 +
Γit
1 + Γit
Sit
1− Sit
]
dpit =
1
1 + Γit
dmcit +
Γit
1 + Γit
dpt
1− Sit + εit, (A11)
we use the decomposition dpt =
∑N
j=1 Sjtdpjt = (1− Sit)dp−it + Sitdpit. Aggregating (A11) across
i = 1..N and solving for dpt, we have:
dpt =
1∑N
i=1
Sit
1+Γ˜it
∑N
i=1
[
Sit
1 + Γ˜it
dmcit +
Sit
1 + SitΓ˜it1+Γit
εit
]
, (A12)
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where Γ˜it ≡ Γit/(1− Sit) and we have used the fact that
∑N
i=1
SitΓ˜it
1+Γ˜it
= 1−∑Ni=1 Sit1+Γ˜it .
Substituting the solution for dpt back into (A11), we obtain the reduced form of the model:
dpit =
1
1 + Γ˜it
dmcit +
Γ˜it
1 + Γ˜it
1∑N
j=1
Sjt
1+Γ˜jt
∑N
j=1
[
Sjt
1 + Γ˜jt
dmcjt +
Sjt
1 +
SjtΓ˜jt
1+Γjt
εjt
]
+
εit
1 + SitΓ˜it1+Γit
,
which we can simplify to (23), dpit = αitdmcit + βitdmc−it + ε˜it, with coecients given by:
αit ≡ 1
1 + Γ˜it
Sit +
∑
j 6=i
Sjt
1+Γ˜jt∑N
j=1
Sjt
1+Γ˜jt
and βit ≡ Γ˜it
1 + Γ˜it
∑
j 6=i
Sjt
1+Γ˜jt∑N
j=1
Sjt
1+Γ˜jt
,
and the competitor marginal cost index dened as:
dmc−it ≡
∑
j 6=i ω
c
ijtdmcjt, where ωcijt ≡
Sjt
1+Γ˜jt∑
k 6=i
Skt
1+Γ˜kt
.
This illustrates the complexity of interpreting the coecients αit and βit of the reduced form of the
model, as well as calculating an appropriate competitor marginal cost index, even in the special case
when Proposition 2 applies.
Aggregation and ERPT Project (A12) onto det:
Ψt ≡ E
{
dpt
det
}
=
1∑N
i=1
Sit
1+Γit/(1−Sit)
∑N
i=1
Sit
1 + Γit/(1− Sit)ϕit,
with the marginal cost projection denoted ϕit ≡ E{dmcit/det} and εit assumed orthogonal to det,
which we state formally as:
E
{
dεit
det
}
=
cov(dεit, det)
var(det)
= 0.
Furthermore, we denote the aggregate ERPT into marginal costs by ϕt ≡
∑N
i=1 Sitϕit. The ERPT into
the aggregate markup is then given by:
Ψt − ϕt =
∑N
i=1 Sitϕit
[
1
1+Γit/(1−Sit) −
∑N
j=1
Sjt
1+Γjt/(1−Sjt)
]
∑N
j=1
Sjt
1+Γjt/(1−Sjt)
=
cov(ϕit, ψ˜it)∑N
j=1 ψ˜jt
,
where γ˜it ≡ 1/[1+Γit/(1−Sit)]. Therefore, a positive correlation between ϕit and Γ˜it = Γit/(1−Sit)
results in a downward adjustment in markup in response to an exchange rate devaluation (det > 0).
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D General Non-CES Oligopolistic Model
Monopolistic competition under CES demand yields constant markups. In this appendix we relax both
assumptions, allowing for general non-CES homothetic demand and oligopolistic competition. This
model nests both Kimball (1995) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
Consider the following aggregator for the sectoral consumption C :
1
N
∑
i∈ΩAiΥ
(
NCi
ξiC
)
= 1, (A13)
where Ω is the set of products i in the sector with N = |Ω| denoting the number of goods, and Ci is
the consumption of product i; Ai and ξi denote the two shifters (a quality parameter and a demand
parameter, respectively); Υ(·) is the demand function such that Υ(·) > 0,Υ′(·) > 0,Υ′′(·) < 0, and
Υ(1) = 1. The two important limiting cases are N → ∞ (corresponding to Kimball monopolistic
competition) and Υ(z) = z(σ−1)/σ (corresponding to the CES aggregator, as in Section 2.2).
Consumers allocate expenditure E to the purchase of products in the sector, and we assume that
E = αP 1−η , where P is the sectoral price index and η is the elasticity of substitution across sectors.
Formally, we write the sectoral expenditure (budget) constraint as:∑
i∈Ω PiCi = E. (A14)
Given prices {Pi}i∈Ω of all products in the sector and expenditure E, consumers allocate consumption
{Ci} optimally across products within sectors to maximize the consumption index C :
max
{Ci}i∈Ω
{
C
∣∣ s.t. (A13) and (A14)}. (A15)
The rst-order optimality condition for this problem denes consumer demand, and is given by:
Ci =
ξiC
N
· ψ (xi) , where xi ≡ Pi/γi
P/D
, (A16)
where γi ≡ Ai/ξi is the quality parameter and ψ(·) ≡ Υ′−1(·) is the demand curve, while ξiC/N
is the normalized demand shifter.51 C is sectoral consumption; P is the ideal price index such that
C = E/P and D is an additional auxiliary variable determined in industry equilibrium, which is
needed to characterize demand outside the CES case.52
Manipulating the optimality conditions and the constraints in (A15), we show that P and D must
51Note that an increase in γi directly reduces the eective price for the good in the eyes of the consumers, which corre-
sponds to a shift along the demand curve. At the same time, an increase in ξi (holding γi constant), shifts out the demand
curve holding the eective price unchanged. This is why we refer to ξi as the demand shifter, and γi as the quality parameter.
52Note that the ideal price index P exists since the demand dened by (A13) is homothetic, i.e. a proportional increase inE
holding all {Pi} constant results in a proportional expansion in C and in all {Ci} holding their ratios constant; 1/P equals
the Lagrange multiplier for the maximization problem in (A15) on the expenditure constraint (A14).
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satisfy:53
1
N
∑
i∈ΩAiΥ
(
ψ
(
Pi/γi
P/D
))
= 1, (A17)
1
N
∑
i∈Ω
ξiPi
P
ψ
(
Pi/γi
P/D
)
= 1. (A18)
Equation (A17) ensures that (A13) is satised given the demand (A16), i.e. that C is indeed attained
given the consumption allocation {Ci}. Equation (A18) ensures that the expenditure constraint (A14)
is satised given the allocation (A16). Note that condition (A18) simply states that the sum of market
shares in the sector equals one, with the market share given by:
Si ≡ PiCi
PC
=
ξiPi
NP
ψ
(
Pi/γi
P/D
)
, (A19)
where we substituted in for Ci from the demand equation (A16).
Next, we introduce the demand elasticity as a characteristic of the slope of the demand curve ψ(·):
σi ≡ σ(xi) = −d logψ(xi)
d log xi
, (A20)
where xi is the eective price of the rm as dened in (A16). Outside the CES case, the demand elasticity
is non-constant and is a function of the eective price of the rm. One can totally dierentiate (A17)–
(A18) to show that:
d logP =
∑
i∈Ω Si d logPi,
d log
P
D
=
∑
i∈Ω
Siσi∑
j∈Ω Sjσj
d logPi.
Given this, we can calculate the full elasticity of demand, which takes into account the eects of Pi on
P and D. Substituting C = E/P = αP−η into (A16), we show:
Σi ≡ −d logCi
d logPi
= ηSi + σi
(
1− Siσi∑
j∈Ω Sjσj
)
, (A21)
which generalizes expression (A10) in the CES case, and also nests the expression for the monopolistic
competition case where Si ≡ 0. In the general case, the optimal prot-maximizing markup is given by
Σi/(Σi − 1), and it can be analyzed in the same way we approached it in Section 2.
53In the limiting case of CES, we have Υ(z) = z
σ−1
σ , and hence Υ′(z) = σ−1
σ
z−1/σ andψ(x) =
(
σ
σ−1x
)−σ
. Substituting
this into (A17)–(A18) and taking their ratio immediately pins down the value of D. We have, D ≡ (σ − 1)/σ and is
independent of {Pj} and other parameters, and hence this auxiliary variable is indeed redundant in the CES case. Given this
D, the price index can be recovered from either condition in its usual form, P =
[
1
N
∑
j∈Ω
(
Aσj ξ
1−σ
j
)
P 1−σj
]1/(1−σ). The
case of CES is a knife-edge case in which the demand system can be described with only the price index P , which summarizes
all information contained in micro-level prices needed to describe aggregate allocation. More generally, the second auxiliary
variable D is needed to characterize the aggregate eects of micro-level heterogeneity. In fact, (P,D) form a sucient
statistic to describe the relevant moments of the price distribution.
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The key insight is that the market share channel in (A21) operates exactly in the same way as in the
CES model of Section 2.2. In the CES model, however, this is the only channel of markup adjustment: as
the rm gains market share, it increases its markup (as long as ρ > η), and markups become atter as all
rms become smaller in absolute terms, with the limiting case of monopolistic competition and constant
markups. More generally, with non-CES demand, the markup elasticity also depends on the properties
of the σ(·) function in (A20), and markups are non-constant even in the limiting case of monopolistic
competition with Si ≡ 0, where the variables that aect the curvature of demand (namely, σ′(·))
determine the variability of the markup. See Klenow and Willis (2006) and Gopinath and Itskhoki
(2010) for an example of non-CES Kimball demand under monopolistic competition, which exhibits
similar qualitative properties of markup variation as the oligopolistic model under CES demand.
Empirical challenge for non-CES models Our empirical analysis emphasizes three key features of
the data:
(i) No strategic complementarities and complete pass-through exhibited by the bulk of small rms;
(ii) Strong strategic complementarities and incomplete pass-through exhibited by the largest rms;
(iii) Extremely fat-tailed distribution of rm sales (market shares), referred to as the Zipf’s law.
We show that the oligopolistic CES model is successful in capturing all of these facts, which at the same
time proves to be challenging for the monopolistic competition models with non-CES demand. First,
capturing fact (i) requires that demand is asymptotically constant elasticity (CES) as the price of the rm
increases and the rm becomes small. Otherwise, the model would produce counterfactual incomplete
pass-through for the small rms. This puts a signicant constraint on the admissible models, ruling out
a number of popular examples (especially if one requires simultaneously matching the incomplete pass-
through characteristic for the entire industry on average). Second, jointly capturing facts (ii) and (iii) is
another challenge. While non-CES demand can easily produce signicant markup variability, resulting
in incomplete pass-through and strategic complementarities (or rather demand complementarities in
this case), this is achieved by means of a declining curvature in demand, as the rms price falls. The
necessary implication of this is that the demand elasticity will be falling towards one, at which point
the rms choose not to grow any further, violating the empirical Zipf’s law, which suggests that the
largest rm is a lot larger than the second-largest rm. Generating Zipf’s law requires that demand
becomes asymptotically constant elasticity (CES) as the rm price decreases. This, however, would
result in counterfactually little markup variability for the largest rms, creating an even greater issue
for the model.
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